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This thesis explores the connections between theories of justice and 
international mediation. Modern theories of justice examine how to achieve a 
just resolution of conflict in a bargaining framework. These theories can 
examine, therefore, the international mediation process because it is a political 
bargaining process that has become triadic. Against the prevailing views in the 
mediation literature, this thesis argues that normative standards of justice are 
possible to be placed on the mediator and the participants to an international 
mediation. Evaluative criteria for a just mediation are developed to test the real 
world application of these standards. The criteria are applied to two mediations, 
the Dayton peace talks, and the Oslo Back Channel. These case studies show 
that it is possible to examine justice in international mediation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the people vote on war, nobody reckons 
On his own death; it is too soon; he thinks 
Some other man will meet that wretched fate. 
However, if death faced him when he cast his vote, 
Hellas would never perish from battle-madness. 
Yet we men all know which of the two words 
Is better, and can weigh the good and the bad 
They bring; how much better is peace than war! 
-EURIPIDES, Suppliant Women 
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One can only imagine the sense of satisfaction for those who successfully negotiate 
the settlement of an international conflict. Yet with the benefits of peace so high, the 
temptation must become so very great to do anything possible to broker peace. On the 
settlement of these disputes, we often hear that the negotiated settlement will bring to 
the parties a 'just and lasting peace'. Yet the concept of justice is something that is 
difficult to define. Unless we know how to achieve or determine what is justice within 
the context in which it is being used this elusive notion will always remain in 
contention. 
This is not a recent dilemma. Socrates in Plato's The Republic, argued that if we knew 
what justice was, then being just would be a comparatively simple exercise. Socrates 
believed that knowledge needed to be applied to moral notions such as justice as 
vigorously as it is to any other subject to overcome one's ignorance and confusion. 
Political philosophy has continued to develop theories of justice within society in the 
belief that social arrangements are a human construction and a theory of justice is a 
theory about the kinds of social arrangements that can be defended by society (Barry 
1989). 
Consequently, political theorists have established that one way in which justice can be 
explained is as a social contract, where the corresponding bargaining process 
(negotiation environment) becomes the mechanism to develop and evaluate rules 
formed within societies. Within this framework, political theorists believe that the role 
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of justice is the regulation of social co-operation. It achieves this by promoting a 
standard for the way people should conduct themselves within a social environment 
(Ryan 1993). 
Political theorists believe that it is difficult to separate the question of what is justice 
from the question why be just, and that the content of justice has to be such that 
people will have a reason for being just (Barry 1989). Therefore, the study of justice 
within a bargaining framework will require an examination of the question: 
What motivates actors within a negotiation or bargaining environment to be just? 
This thesis will examine justice within the context of international mediation. It will 
argue that the principles of justice that have been developed by political theorists can 
assist in the development of a framework to assess the justice of the international 
mediation process because: 
Whatever its specific characteristics, mediation must in essence be seen as an extension of the 
negotiation process whereby an acceptable third party intervenes to change the course or 
outcome of a particular conflict. The third party, with no authoritative decision-making power, 
is there to assist the disputants in their search for a mutually acceptable agreement 
(Bercovitch 1996: 12). 
Within this polidcal bargaining process, participants to a mediation make agreements 
that affect the political rights of the constituents (the populations or societies the 
participants represent) and will develop rules in these negotiated agreements to avoid 
conflicts. Therefore, it is appropriate that justice and hence, the moral motivation of 
the parties to a political bargaining process, should be examined within the triadic 
negotiation environment of international mediation. As Eight~enth century 
philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested, if someone can affect another through their 
act~ons then they ought to enter into relations that encompass justice and just 
institutions must be established if the action of one affects the other (Kant 1795). 
Current mediation theory discusses justice only from the viewpoint of the participants, 
and only in hindsight (Peachey 1989). While such evaluative non-normative analysis 
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of people's beliefs about a mediation are no doubt important, this thesis argues that 
there are prior normative questions to be asked. Primarily, what standards of justice 
ought to be placed on the mediator and the parties to a mediation? This is important, 
not only for the theoretical integrity of international mediation itself, but also for the 
constituents of the parties to the mediation. For it is the constituents' political rights 
that will be affected by the mediation, and where individuals' political rights are 
affected the normative questions of justice must be answered. Where those questions 
remain unanswered, there will always remain the possibility of doubt as to the justice 
of a mediated agreement. And where such doubts remain, the stability and durability 
of the agreement is in doubt. 
I Thematic Organisation 
Chapter one of this thesis will review the existing literature on justice in mediation 
and will explain why, in certain circumstances, an examination of international 
mediation in terms of a political theory of justice is necessary. In Chapter Two, a 
modern critique developed by Brian Barry will be used to review the literature on the 
political theories of justice to determine the principles of justice that should be applied 
to international mediation. Brian Barry believes that the literature on justice follows 
two general lines of thought which he categorises into two contemporary theories, 
justice as mutual advantage andjustice as impartiality. These theories are essentially 
the theoretica1 frameworks for explaining what motivates actors within a bargaining 
environment to promote just relationships. Barry's justice as mutual advantage. will be 
examined and applied to international mediation, but emphasis will be placed on what 
Barry considers the most satisfactory theory of political justice, the theory of justice as 
impartiality. This theory delivers a contemporary approach to the study of justice and 
will be the political theory of justice this thesis applies to international mediation. In 
addition, Chapter Two will explain what constitutes fairness within this political 
theory of justice, and will demonstrate why this conception of fairness is important to 
the international mediation process. As international mediation involves states, this 
chapter will then argue that at some level, nation states possess a motivation to be 
moral, since this is a necessary pre-condition for the application of the theory of 
justice as impartiality to international mediation. This chapter will conclude with a 
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definition of a just negotiation environment in terms of the theory of justice as 
impartiality. 
Chapter three will apply the political theory of justice, justice as impartiality, to the 
international mediation process. It will describe the process of international mediation 
through a 'contingency model'. It will show the types of behavioural strategies that 
mediators have at their disposal to influence the decision-making process of the 
parties within the negotiation environment. Given this ability to influence decision-
making, it is important that the mediation style is analysed to ascertain its impact on a 
negotiation environment in terms of the theory of justice as impartiality. Chapter Four 
will outline a set of evaluative criteria for applying the theory of justice as impartiality 
so that a real world mediation event. 
Chapter Five will use this evaluative criteria to analyse the Dayton negotiations to see 
how the actions of the mediator affected this negotiation environment in terms of a 
political theory of justice. Chapter Six will use the same evaluative criteria for the 
Oslo Back Channel as a comparison. 
II Research Design 
For the purpose of this thesis, the pronoun for a mediator will be referred to in the 
masculine. This does not connote gender. When this thesis refers to parties, it means 
the parties to a conflict excluding the mediator, and is inter-changeable with the word 
participants. 
Mediation is a complex social process. Current research, especially empirical research 
and the development of the contingency approach to mediation provides us with an 
analytical framework for the mediation process. This approach is based in a social-
psychological framework and has been derived from negotiation theory (Bercovitch 
1986; Druckman 1977; Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965). The contingency approach 
describes a range of factors that have an impact on the mediation process. The model 
is developed through clusters of variables that will affect a mediation event. Such 
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clusters are organised by context. They will be conditions that are antecedent (historic 
context of dispute), current (actual mediation process) or consequent (outcome of 
dispute) (Bercovitch 1996). This approach will be diagrammatically represented in 
Chapter Three. The contingency approach enables scholars to identify the type of 
mediator behaviour and the consequent negotiation environment that is present in a 
mediation. Specifically, it identifies the types of mediator behaviour that detrimentally 
affect the negotiation environment in terms of justice as prescribed for in the theory, 
justice as impartiality. 
Five questions have been formulated to evaluate international mediation in terms of a 
political theory of justice. These are : 
1. Were there pre-conditions placed on the framework for negotiations? 
2. Were the parties free to deliberate on the procedures for the negotiations and 
consequences of any outcome? 
3. Were the parties equally well-placed in the negotiation environment? 
4. Did the mediation style involve the use of directive strategies to direct outcomes? 
5. Did the parties feel that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope? 
This thesis will apply the above criteria to two documented real world mediation 
events to answer whether or not a just negotiation environment existed in terms of the 
theory of justice as impartiality. The two specific real world mediation events chosen 
are the Dayton negotiations and the negotiations between Israel and Palestine that 
were developed by the Oslo Back Channel. The reasons why these mediation events 
have been chosen are two-fold. First, each event resulted in a mediated agreement that 
aff~cted the basic political rights of the constituents to the mediation. Second, each 
mediation had different levels of mediator intervention, which enables a comparison 
between mediation styles and the effect these styles have on a just negotiation 
environment in terms of justice as impartiality. A detailed account of the actual 
mediation processes can be ascertained from the relatively comprehensive memoirs of 
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the diplomats and negotiators. From these accounts answers to the above questions 
can be obtained. 
The study of specific cases of international mediation enables this thesis to meet the 
two criteria for a successful project as outlined by Jeffrey Rubin (Bercovitch 1997; 
Rubin 1981). 
1. That it deal with real world events; 
2. Use of a theoretical perspective. 
The criteria developed in this thesis do not make for a hypothesis that must be tested 
empirically but rather, provide a theoretical perspective on international mediation in 
relation to justice that will create a standard to examine, critically, the mediation 
process. This theoretical perspective allows the actions of a mediator within a specific 
case of mediation to be assessed against a theory of justice which enables an 
awareness of how a mediator should or should not act if his behaviour is to be 
evaluated in terms of justice. 
This study assumes that there is a long-term benefit to a negotiated agreement that 
promotes a just peace. Future research could be undertaken to determine, empirically, 
if there is a correlation between the endurance of mediated agreements by a process 
that has been detenr.il'led by this study's evaluative criteria for justice and those that 
have not. 
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1 RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
TO INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 
Our task as philosophers requires that we try to imagine new, better political structures. Yes, we must 
be realistic, but not to the point of presenting ... the essentials of the status quo as unalterable facts. 
-Thomas Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples. 
There is an important assumption that must be made about international mediation 
before it can be assessed in terms of justice The assumption is that mediation. is nc! a 
value-free process. Even though it is a voluntary process, the mediator does affect the 
negotiation behaviour of the parties. Mediation research supports this assumption. 
In the past, mediator characteristics have been examined in depth as requisites for mediator 
ability, effectiveness and success. r.onclusions from this line of research (e.g., Brett, Drieghe, 
and Shapiro 1986; Carnevale 1986; Shapiro, Drieghe, and Brett 1985; Young 1967) suggest 
that a mediator is a powerful catalytic agent whose presence alone can influence the parties' 
negotiating behaviour (Bercovitch and Houston 2000: 180). 
If the mediator does affect the parties' behaviour then the justice of the mediator's 
actions and thus, the justice of the mediation is able to be examined. 
This chapter will show that there is a need to extend the existing research criteria for 
the assessment of mediation. The existing mediation literature on justice relies on a 
social-psychological framework to develop categories of justice that are applied to a 
mediation event. This chapter will show that this approach is not always appropriate 
for the evaluation of mediator behaviour within the international mediation context. 
The social-psychological categories consider justice in terms of how the parties to a 
mediation perceived the outcomes, mediator behaviour and process. They are 
participant specific and retrospective. The role of justice within a political framework 
on the other hand is to regulate social behaviour by promoting a standard of behaviour 
by participants within the political bargaining process. It will be shown that 
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international mediation outcomes can detrimentally affect political rights, and 
therefore, in this context the behaviour of a mediator and the consequent mediated 
agreement ought to be assessed in terms of a political theory of justice (Kant 1795). 
I Existing Criteria for the Examination of Justice in Mediation 
The mediation literature determines what is just for a mediation event by using 
various social-psychology developed categories of justice that have been adopted from 
participant viewpoints. The following are the major categories of justice in the 
assessment of mediation developed in the literature: 
Distributive Justice has been defined as the fairness of the distribution of the 
conditions and goods that affect individual well-being (Deutche 1985). 
Procedural Justice refers to the individual's perception of fairness of the rules of 
procedure that regulate a process or give rise to a decision (Peachey 1989; Austin and 
Tobiason 1984; Folger 1977; Leventhel1976; Deutche1975). 
Interactional Justice refers to how people react to their perceptions regarding the 
social sensitivity of the inter-personal treatment they receive from decision makers 
(Rahim, Magner, and Shapiro 2000; Bies and Moag, 1986). 
Restorative Justice refers to the restoration of a situation or relationship as best one 
can, following damage, injury or other wrongdoing and includes processes of 
retribution, restitution, compensation and forgiveness (Peachey 1989). 
An example of the use of these categories is in What People Want from Mediation 
(Peachey 1989). Peachey believes that mediation is not a value-free process where 
parties arrive at whatever outcome they can agree to. He argues that such a focus on 
outcomes has created a confusion in the literature between process and outcome. 
Consequently, he uses the categories of procedural justice along with an additional 
category of restorative justice to assess what justice is within the mediation context. 
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Recent studies have introduced an additional category of interactional justice for the 
determination of justice within the mediation context. Interactional justice examines 
participants' perceptions of the inter-personal treatment that they have received from 
decision-makers (Rahim, Magner, and Shapiro 2000; Bies and Moag, 1986). 
These categories have been developed to examine justice from the viewpoint of how 
the participants reacted to the mediation process and consequent outcomes. By 
developing social-psychological standards, the assessment of justice becomes 
subjective to each participant and their individual responses to the procedures and 
outcomes of mediation. This approach reinforces the commonly held belief that 
justice depends on what the participants themselves pelieve as just. For example, in 
response to Golda Meir' s assertion that it was unfair for them to make concessions 
when they did not start the 1967 war, Kissenger reinforced to Golda Meir the notion 
that each side to a conflict has its own definition of justice (Pruitt 1989). If justice is 
su0jective (or if there is an intrinsic norm of justice) then the only way thal it can be 
studied in the context of mediation is to examine how the actions of mediators 
affected the participants' perceptions of justice, or how actual outcomes from the 
mediation process affected each party to a negotiation (although recent studies have 
confirmed that the two are inter-related) (see Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992). 
Research on justice has been conducted on this premise. For example, in an inter-
personal mediation study by Lissak and Sheppard (1972) interviews were conducted 
to assess the parties' perceptions of the fairness of mediation procedure. In an 
international mediation study by Arad and Carnevale (1994) mediator bias was 
examined in terms of parties' perceptions of mediator fairness: "In a recent study, we 
(Arad and Carnevale 1994) demonstrated that perceived bias is in the eye of the 
beholder" (Bercovitch 1996: 46). 
For an assessment of specific mediation outcomes, the mediation literature uses a 
normative framework, in other words, a specific criteria to determine whether the 
outcomes were fair to the parties. What this means is that if normative criteria is 
developed to determine whether or not a mediation outcome is fair to the parties, then 
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the mediation would be considered as successful when the specific criteria of fairness 
has been met. The mediation literature has identified problems with this approach. It 
has been argued that by attempting to define what is fair by a normative criteria, 
scholars have introduced the problem of conflicting standards: 
First, outcome fairness is extremely difficult to define since many, often-conflicting standards 
exist for evaluating whether a particular outcome is fair. (Leventhal 1976), including equity, 
equality, need, code, contract, precedent, intentionality, legitimacy, and right (Lissak and 
Sheppard 1972: 46). 
To summarise, in a social-psychological framework, the purpose of introducing a 
notion of justice is to evaluate mediation in terms of the parties' perceptions of justice, 
or in relation to outcomes, the creation of a standard to evaluate mediation in terms of 
the perceived effect of the outcome on the parties. 
II A Political Theory of Justice 
A political theory of justice, however, does not look at participant perceptions because 
the role of justice is to regulate social behaviour by developing a standard for the way 
people behave within a social environment. A political theory of justice based on a 
bargaining framework considers what motivates participants to be just within the 
negotiation environment itself. Specifically, the theory of justice as impartiality, 
which is taken as the key framework for this thesis, is distinct from the psychological 
categories of justice in that: 
1. It looks at the negotiation environment itself and what is the motivation of each 
participant to be just toward the opposite party while they are negotiating po~\tical 
agreements. 
2. The fairness of an agreement is what the parties themselves decide is fair within a 
negotiation environment that has been deemed to be just in terms of the theory of 
justice as impartiality. 
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Conclusion 
International mediation is about the political bargaining behaviour of states. A 
political theory of justice is needed to examine why the participants should be just to 
the opposing party in the political process of bargaining. This is important for 
international mediation because people may have to accept restrictions on their basic 
political rights in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of a dispute. Within a political 
theory of justice it is the motivation of the participants in the bargaining process to be 
just that creates the conditions for outcomes to be just, and not simply the nature of 
the outcome, or the participants' perceptions of the mediation process and outcome. 
This study will now proceed to review the political theories of justice within the 
theoretical perspective developed by Brian Barry and show how they can be applied to 
international mediation. It will also show why the theory of justice as impartiality has 






honeste vivere, neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere. 
AND BARGAINING 
(the usefulness of rules, which enforce honesty, prevents harm, and secures each person his own). 
It is assumed in this thesis that the regulation of social co-operation is based on the 
notion of a social contract where agreements are reached between conflicting parties 
to alter or affect their behaviour toward each other. It is also assumed that rules are 
developed within society based on these agreements and the rules of justice are, "the 
kind of rules thai every society needs if it is to avoid conflict - on any scale from 
mutual frustration to civil war" (Barry 1998: 202). 
Three main theories of justice have been developed by political theorists to explain 
the motivation of the participants within the negotiation environment that create these 
rules of justice. These three theories of justice can be distinguished by their primary 
assumptions about the motivation to be just. Two of the theories seek to provide a 
theoretical model for human behaviour to explain the participants' behaviour. The 
other theory takes a principled approach and provides a standard under which 
participants should behave to be just. 
Brian Barry summarises and categorises the lines of thought running through the 
literature on justice into either the motivational or the principled approach. From this 
analysis, he develops two theories of justice. The first is based on the motivational 
approach where justice is derived through "the sense of the long-term 
advantageousness to one-self of being just" (Barry 1989: 359). This theory of justice 
is present in the works of Plato ar1d runs through the Seventeenth century theorists 
Hobbes, Hume and took mathematical shape this century in the Theory of Games and 
Economic Behaviour by J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern (1944). Barry names 
this the theory justice as mutual advantage. The second theory is based on the 
enlightenment principles developed by Kant and refined by John Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice. Barry names this theory a theory of justice as impartiality. 
13 
A third general theory of justice exists, and is posited by Barry as a theory of justice as 
reciprocity. Rawls is said to represent this theory, which will be examined even 
though Barry considers the theory of justice as reciprocity only a hybrid of the other 
two. These theories are essentially the theoretical formats for explaining how just 
relationships are developed in society through a process of bargaining. 
We can now examine the mechanisms of these theories. In doing so, we can explore 
what these theories say about what motivates the parties to be just, and how the parties 
should behave within the negotiation environment to be just, in their attempt to find 
an agreement. It is anticipated that a critiqu~ of these approaches to justice \-Vill 
provide a framework to understand the motivation to be just for the negotiation 
environment of international mediation. 
I Justice as Mutual Advantage 
The essence of a theory of justice as mutual advantage (JMA) is that co-operation 
between members of a society is better than a state of perpetual conflict: "Peace is 
better for everyone than a war of all against all" (Barry 1989: 6). 
While this theory makes no determination of the notion justice within the negotiation 
environment, it justifies the inequality that exists within socielies on the basis that co-
operation will place members of a society in a better position than if no co-operation 
existed at all. It assumes that members of society have the ability to make rational 
decisions about the larger benefits of co-operating even where such co-operation 
seems detrimental. 
The inequalities that may develop through the negotiation process or trade-off are less 
important than the establishment of a state of peaceful co-operation. On this basis the 
motivation behind the settlement of a conflict of interest is: 
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one that reflects the balance of forces - the strategic advantage and dis-advantages of the 
parties - so that they have an equally strong incentive to comply with its requirements on 
condition that others do so as well (Barry 1989: 283). 
The motive to be just within the bargaining environment, according to the theory of 
JMA, is. self-interest. It is preferable in the end for parties to agree to restrict or 
restrain their behaviour for the sake of co-operation. To represent this underlying 
motivation within a bargaining framework theorists have developed a general theory 
of rational behaviour, which provides a prescriptive approach to the examination of 
human behaviour within a bargaining model. The game theoretic models of 
bargaining developed under the general theory of rational behaviour provide an 
excellent analytical framework to-consider the notion of mediation under the theory of 
JMA. It is interesting to note, utilising the theory of a social contract Hobbes, (and 
later, Burne) found an excellent analytical tool to assess the concept and justification 
of private property rights. 
Concepts of Game Theory 
Game theory provides an analytical representation of bargaining where the party's 
motivation is self-interest. Game theory was originally developed from the article 
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour published by von Neumann and 
Morgenst~m (1944). The theory has been defined as: 
the theory of rational behaviour by two or more interacting rational individuals, each of them 
determined to maximise his own interests, whether selfish or unselfish, as specified by his own 
utility function (pay-off function). (though some or all players may very well assign high 
utilities to clearly altruistic objectives, this need not prevent a conflict of interest between them 
since they may possibly assign high utilities to quite different and perhaps strongly conflicting, 
altruistic objectives) (Harsanyi 1986: 89). 
Nash (1950) introduced the notion of bargaining within this framework and developed 
a model of game theory which could mathematically represent the bargaining process 
between interacting rational individuals. Nash introduced an analysis for non-co-
operative bargaining by examining various equilibrium points on an axis from which 
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th~ pareto frontier, the non-agreement point and co-operative surplus, could be 
developed. However, this has been criticised: " if all we can say is that the outcome of 
the game will be an equilibrium point ... then we are saying little more than that 
almost any thing can happen in a game" (Harsanyi 1986: 105). Harsanyi therefore 
introduces the Batesian solution for non-co-operative games, which overcomes this 
analytical flaw, by introducing a specific equilibrium point as a solution to the game. 
Nash assumed that rational people will only obtain an agreement that will make them 
better off than their original position of non-agreement. The specific equilibrium 
point, therefore, must always generate a co-operative surplus. In other words, rational 
individuals under this theoretical bargaining proceE:s will only make an agreement 
where there is a 'mutual advantage' to do so. 
The outcome of bargaining will lie on that part of the pareto frontier that is above the 
· non-agreement point. This process and the resultant outcome have become known as 
the "Nash Solution" being the position where; "Rational Bargainers will finish up at 
the point where the product of utilities of the parties is maximised when the non-
agreement outcome is assigned zero utility to each party" (Barry 1989: 14) 
The outcome of this bargaining will still, however, reflect the parties' power 
differential. If a party has greater power, then their satisfaction level will be different 
to the other party's as they are in a position to upset any solution with which they are 
not content. 
A .lecture by Braithwaite, A Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher 
(1955) showed additional ways the theory could be developed as a representative 
model of hargaining behaviour. In this lecture, Braithwaite put forward the idea that 
the non-agreement point of the parties is determined by optimal threats. The non-
agr~ement point is not pre-determined, but rather is based on these threats. Reaching 
an agreement is achieved through the preservation of the parties' relative positions at 
their non-agreement point. This is in contrast to the Nash Solution, where equilibrium 
is found at the point where both parties are risking the same utility loss (in terms of 
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their own utilities) from pressing for more concessions rather than accepting what has 
been negotiated (Barry 1989). 
In summary, the difference between Nash and Braithwaite is the way in which parties 
move to the pareto frontier (being the set of pareto-optimal points). For Nash, it is the 
mutive to gain a benefit from the negotiation in the light of each parties' bargaining 
strength. For Braithwaite it is how each party can affect the other parties' negotiating 
position through their relative bargaining power at the non-agreement point (i.e. their 
optimal threats). These game theoretic models, therefore, show two ways in which 
rational individuals with a motivation to maximise their own interests behave in 
attempting a negotiated outcome from a position of non-agreement or possible 
conflict. 
Mediation and Game Theory 
As already, stated international mediation is about introducing a third party to the 
negotiation process. The raison d' etre for the third party in the game theoretic model 
is to avoid a deadlock between the parties during the bargaining process. If each party 
makes a stated final offer then it would be very difficult after this revelation to retract 
and maintain credibility. A neutral third party is able to assess the bargaining power of 
the parties and seek a solution, which will reflect the parties' hypothetical agreements, · 
had they not been frustrated by their unwillingness to alter their so-c;:tlled final threat. 
Any other solution is not stable, because if one party receives an outcome that is 
inconsistent with his threat advantage or without a co-operative surplus, then he can 
disrupt or withdraw from negotiations. 
A mediated solution (especially as mediation is a voluntary process) will reflect direct 
negotiations in a rational framework. It is the solution the parties would have accepted 
themselves after considering the benefits over and above a non-agreement had they 
not been frustrated (Barry 1989). 
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Justice in Game Theory 
The concept of a co-operative surplus (being the gain that will be achieved by the 
parties from a negotiated agreement) is the foundation for the theory of mutual 
advantage and makes an assessment of justice in mediation simple. Given mediation 
is based on a voluntary bargaining process, both parties have certain rights that cannot 
be affected by the bargaining process. The consequent division of the co-operative 
surplus must, by definition, result in a gain to each party that would not have occurred 
without the bargaining process. 
Any consideration of morality during this bargaining process is 'rationalised' out of 
the equation because moral rules are simply rules that will be advantageous to the 
parties in the long-term: "There can be no competition between the claims of morality 
and those of self-interest, because morality is simply the form that self-interest takes 
under certain conditions" (Barry 1989: 84). 
In this analytical framework, the unfairness of an unequal division of the co-operative 
surplus through the inequality of bargaining positions does not matter. The important 
point is that a surplus exists. The means of obtaining such an advantage is less 
important than the fact that a co-operative agreement has been achieved which has 
made the parties better off than if they had not engaged in the bargaining process at 
all. 
The Limitations of Game Theory 
Game theory shows how bargaining mechanisms work when actors are rational 
individuals maximising their own conflicting self-interests. Game theory is therefore 
about "how our aims are achieved and not what our aims should be" (Elster 1986: 2). 
Game theory may describe a very interesting model of bargaining behaviour, but it 
does not provide a standard for human behaviour within a bargaining context (other 
than maximising one's own interest). 
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Barry, summarising Hume, states that justice becomes a virtue because moral 
judgements require a common standard and that standard, as far as Hume was 
concerned is an impartial sympathy with the interest of all affected (Barry 1989: 49). 
Game theory provides no such sympathy, but rather reflects behavioural patterns, and 
therefore cannot provide any standard of behaviour on which parties are to negotiate. 
There does not seem to be any purpose to the examination of justice using game 
theory. Justice is a virtue of humanity. A theory of justice should be based on the 
motivation of people within the context of their societies rather than the consequence 
of their behaviour. 
Game theory is one branch of the general theory of rational behaviour, so by definition 
it makes two essential assumptions about human behaviour, first: that parties 
themselves will be rational individuals; and second, that the parties intend to 
maximise their own good. The theory becomes predictive of actual behaviour because 
it assumes that during the decision-making process preferences are made based on 
self-interest. As stated by Rawls "what connects the theory of justice with the theory 
of Rational Choice is that we have to w~certain which principles it would be rational to 
adopt given the contractual situation" (Rawls 1972: 17). 
Under the theory of JMA, our preferences, being based on self-interest, will create 
principles of justice that serve the self. Any outcome that is detrimental in the short 
term will simply be a trade-off for a greate~ long-term gain. For example, altruism 
does not have any short-term benefits, but there may be a long-term benefit of security 
associated with such benevolence. In a circular argument characteristic of game 
theory, Graftstein (1992) makes the point that the cultural framework for organizing 
beliefs and preferences are rationally learned. This means that social norms will 
always ensure that an outcome is rational. If one is to assume that self-interest is 
indeed the basic motivating criteria for a bargaining framework, Barry still proceeds 
to most successfully defeat the theory of JMA by turning the argument onto itself. 
As explained, the motivation for being just within a rational framework is the fact that 
it is in one's own long-term interest. It is in the interest of the parties to accept 
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restrictions from institutions that create a long-term benefit. Consequently, a long-
term benefit will accrue from the short-term cost of a just agreement. However, if the 
essential motivating criteria are self-interest, then the parties (out of their own self-
interest) will attempt to avoid the consequences of the agreement whenever they can 
because they have no moral obligation to refrain from cheating. Barry states: "that no 
system of penalties can be set up among people motivated purely by self-interest that 
can ensure a degree of compliance sufficient to prevent the scheme of co-operation 
from collapsing" (Barry 1998: 217). The concept of mutual advantage is therefore 
fundamentally flawed because, "the motive that led people to assent to it is also a 
motive that leads them to re-nege on it" (Barry 1998: 117). 
In summary, the theory of justice by mutual advantage embodies the simple notion 
that co-operation between the parties is better than non-co-operation, in the long-term. 
To get beyond the non co-operative 'baseline' human behaviour is motivated by the 
pursuit of the individual's self-interest or 'good' because it is assumed that there is a 
long-term benefit in an agreement to co-operate. Game theory has provided an 
analytical model to illustrate the process and outcomes of bargaining behaviour from 
the assumptions made within the theory. 
The assumption used in the general theory of rational behaviour is that the parties are 
motivated by self-interest. Barry uses this premise to show that agreements made in 
the pursuit of each parties self interest will always be self-defeating, because the 
parties would always find ways of reneging on their responsibilities. To look at the 
justness of a negotiation one needs to look beyond rational self-interest because game 
theory provides no long-term incentive to maintain an agreement. Thus, one needs to 
examine other reasons for being just. . 
II Justice as Reciprocity 
The theory of Justice as Reciprocity (JAR) is based on the principle that it is 
reasonable to expect that those who gives benefits should receive equivalent benefits 
in return. This is the fundamental principle in the work A Theory of Justice by John 
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Rawls. Rawls claimed that there was a duty of fairness that applied to all just 
societies. This concept embraces a normative framework where rights and duties 
between parties are inextricably linked: "the obligation which participants who have 
knowingly accepted the benefits of their common practice owe to each other to act in 
accordance with it when their performance falls due" (Rawls 1962: 146). 
The theory still utilises the basic motivational approach of JMA, (self-interest), but 
adds fairness as the motive for limiting a person's desire to maximise his own 
interests. Reciprocity of benefits will ensure that a self-interested approach by one 
party does not create such an unequal division or burden that one could not possibly 
justify the outcome. 
Barry believes that Rawls' notion of fairness is based on three premises from which 
his theories of justice are based. These are; the fundamental equality of human beings; 
that the distribution of resources must be able to be justified by those who will receive 
the least; and that must always exist a 'separateness of persons' (Barry 1998: 188) The 
concept of the 'separate of persons' means that the individual is the essential element 
in the consideration of justice, and moral values are based on the individual and not 
with society in aggregate. Policies, therefore, cannot be justified because they will 
benefit the majority. In essence, this is where justice-based considerations and 
utilitarianism diverge (Ryan 1993). 
Unequal bargaining positions, and the corresponding unequal outcomes from a 
bargaining framework, cannot satisfy the Rawlsian notion of fairness. Rawls devises a 
hypothetical construction to address the inherent unfairness created by the unbridled 
pursuit of the good. Motivation to bargain is still based on self-interest, but the 
outcome or division is restricted by the introduction of a construction that will ::;et 
arbitrary limits to the exploitation of one party by another. 
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The Rawlsian Construction 
In order to create fairness Rawls develops a hypothetical construction for the 
bargaining framework, being an 'original position' from which the principles of 
justice are derived. Justice exists (the circumstances of justice) when these principles 
are upheld (Rawls 1972: 118-130). The parties will uphold these principles because, 
as explained above, they are maximising their long-term benefits by accepting 
restrictions or burdens in the short-term (Rawls 1972). Rawls creates the original 
position by casting a 'veil of ignorance' over the parties, which denies the parties 
knowledge of their position and identity in society (Rawls 1972: 136-142). The veil 
denies access to information to remove any bias in their decision-making. The parties 
are able to generate a fair bargain between them because all parties are equal at the 
original position, so bargaining inequalities cannot eventuate to affect the outcome. 
The parties will have identical information and will be pursuing the same objectives. 
In fact, as Barry states they become "inter-changeable" (Barry 1998: 190). 
In summary, the parties are still motivated by self-interest. Rawls attempts, however, 
to overcome any inequality of bargaining power at the negotiation baseline by 
introducing a 'veil of ignorance' over the parties. This creates hypothetical pre-
conditions necessary to develop just principles that envelop the notion of fairness into 
the outcome, in other words, equality. 
The Limitations of Justice as Reciprocity 
Unfortunately, the 'veil of ignorance' in making earh party inter-changeable makes 
the whole notion of bargaining redundant. The parties, through their lack of 
information, cannot ascertain their actual conflict situation, yet the rules of justice are 
those rules that are needed to avoid conflict (Barry 1995). Although the parties in 
Rawls 'original position', behind the 'veil of ignorance' are fundamentally equal, the 
operation of the 'veil' unfortunately prevents the satisfaction of the other two 
fundamental principles espoused by Rawls. The parties who would be most affected 
22 
by a distribution of resources cannot be identified under a 'veil of ignorance' nor 
could there be a 'separateness of persons', as by construction the parties in the veil are 
'inter-changeable' with each other under. 
Although Barry's work draws significantly from Rawl's theories of justice his 
comments reveal a serious flaw in the application of JAR to negotiation theory and the 
need arises for another contractually based theory. This need is answered by Barry 
with his theory of justice as impartiality. 
Ill Justice as lmparliality 
The motivation to be just in the theories of JMA and JAR is self-interest. Agreements 
created out of self-interest reflect the bargaining power of the parties. Parties with the 
greater power would have the ability to alter the agreement at any point if they were 
not satisfied with the trade-off between their short-term alld long-term interests. 
JAR attempts to overcome this inequality by imposing hypothetical pre-conditions to 
the bargaining environment, but this prevents actual bargaining behaviour. Therefore, 
it provides no method to regulate the results of agreements. 
The theory of Justice as Impartiality (JAI) is different because it develops an 
alternative motivation to self-interest and in the process detaches justice from 
bargaining power. Justice as Impartiality states "that justice should be the content of 
an agreement that would be reached by rational people under the conditions that do 
not allow for bargaining power to be translated into advantage" (Barry 1989: 7). 
Instead of self-interest, the motive for being just becomes: "The desire to act in 
accordance with principles that could not reasonably be rejected by people seeking an 
agreement with others under conditions free from morally irrelevant bargaining 
advantages and disadvantages" (Barry 1989: 8). 
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The moral motivation to act in accordance with principles that could not reasonably 
be rejected is based upon the desire to be in a position where one can justify an action 
to oneself or to others. Barry speculates that the human experience of inter-
dependence generates a pre-disposition to acquire the pre-requisite moral motivation 
of reasonableness. Inter-dependence, he believes, encourages people to consider the 
reasonableness of ones' own behaviour in light of others. Barry accepts that at first 
instance this motivation is conceptually weak in comparison to the motive of self-
interest. He defends his position, however, by stating that the pursuit of self-interest is 
no more an empirically tested norm than the desire to be impartial: "The equation of 
rationality with the efficient pursuit of self-interest is, as far as I can see, pure 
assertion. It can therefore fitly be opposed by the counter-assertion, namely, that it is 
equally rational to care about what can be defended impartially"(Barry 1989: 285). 
Also, unlike the notion of self-interest, there is no need to prove the universality of the 
theory of JAI, since it develops a standard of behaviour. Self-interest, f0r example, in 
game theory must be a universal norm for game theory to have a predictive effect. 
Oppositely, JAI operates as a touchstone, a litmus test, since Barry defines his appeal 
to reason as not one of logical deduction but of "reasoned argument, from premises 
that are in principle open to everyone to accept" (Barry 1989: 7). 
The appeal to reason is not an appeal to reasoned logic, which triggers the use of 
mathematical deduction and modelling to prescribe outcomes. There is no need for 
methodological enquiry, because Barry's theory, unlike the general theory of rational 
behaviour, is not trying to predict an outcome based on human behavioural patterns. 
Barry believes that a notion of justice that embodies an appeal to reason overcomes 
the fundamental flaw of JMA and JAR. It overcomes, that is, the ability of JMA an 
JAR to prevent an advantageous outcome to those with a stronger bargaining position. 
The Scanlonian Construction 
Barry accepts without question the underlying ideas of Rawls' A Theory of Justice and 
the three basic 'building blocks' of his theory. The building blocks, as already 
explained, are the fundamental equality of human beings, the justification of the 
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distribution of resources by those most affected by it, and the concept of 'separateness 
of persons'. As explained earlier, Barry does not believe that the Rawlsian 
construction delivers an outcome that would incorporate the three building blocks 
Rawls himself has established as the minimum criteria for the development of 
principles of justice that are fair. Barry believes that a construction originally devised 
by T M.Scanlon more effectively allows the development of Rawls' above mentioned 
principles within a bargaining environment. The basic premise of this construction is: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be dis-allowed by any 
system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour, which no one could reasonably reject 
as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement (Scanlon 1982: 110 ). 
In this construction, the parties are aware of their identities and are not motivated 
solely by self-interest, but also by "the desire for reasonable agreement" (Scanlon 
1982: 115). 
Barry believes that the Scanlonian construction will embody Rawls' fundamental 
building blocks by imputing a common standard of reasonableness (Barry 1989: 191). 
Equality is maintained because "all those affected have to be able to feel that they 
have done as well as they could reasonably hope to" (Barry 1995: 7). 
Discrimination based on race, for example, could not reasonably be expected to be 
accepted by those against whom the discrimination is made as any principle that 
develops a notion of inequality would not be accepted by any rational person who is to 
be restricted by such a principle. 
The 'separateness of persons' is also maintained under the Scanlonian construction, 
because a person who was to be badly affected by an agreement would be justified in 
refusing to agree to it. Every party, as long as the objection is reasonable has a power 
of veto. The operation of a veto ensures that the outcome will be justified to those 
who least benefit from the outcome. The parties, as explained, know each other's 
identity so those who are most affected by a negotiated outcome are identified and can 
implement the veto. The operation of the veto, however, is only effective if it is 
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tenable for the parties to return to the non-agreement point. A party may be forced into 
an agreement to avoid the untenable position of non-agreement. 
With JMA the non-agreement point becomes the frame of reference for determining 
outcomes. The non-agreement point itself is the standard from which the parties are 
working, and the fear of returning to a non-agreement position creates the bargaining 
power of the parties. This bargaining power, however, does not create injustice 
because it is assumed that the essence of bargaining is the achievement of a co-
operative surplus. JAI places no such si~nificance to the non-agreement point: 
Whether or not those with superior natural endowments can legitimately claim to reap 
advantages in a just society is something to be thrashed out in the Scanlonian choosing 
situation. However, there is one argument that the parties cannot appeal to, and that is the 
argument that they would do relatively well in the absence of an agreement. For the theory 
supplies no basis for saying that the non-agreement point is itself a just starting place (Barry 
1998: 226). 
To avoid the exploitation of one party's unequal bargaining position (being in a more 
vulnerable position at the non-agreement point) the Scanlonian constmction 
determines that an agreement should be unforced. The parties, therefore, should not be 
coerced into an agreement out of fear of the consequent 'state of nature' (a situation 
brought about by unconstrained attempts of each party to maximise their good without 
any agreement) if .Q.O agreement is reached or by any threat advantage from the other 
party to the bargain. 
The Scanlonian construction further requires that there should be an informed 
agreement. Barry believes that: "The idea of an 'informed agreement' is meant to 
exclude agreements based on superstition or false belief about the consequences of 
actions, even if these beliefs are ones which it would be reasonable for the person in 
qu~stion to have" (Barry 1995: 69). 
This clearly raises the question, on what premise does one judge whether one, or 
someone else is informed? For instance, if it is upon a religious premise, then the 
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background knowledge and assumptions of the party will be entirely different to the 
assumptions of a person whose premise is one of science. 
Barry tries to overcome this problem by stating the contractual theory should embody 
a system of resolution for disagreements about the consequences of an agreement. He 
believes that if we assume that people are well informed, concerned to further their 
own interests and their conceptions of the good, then they will be capable of 
recognising reasonable objections on the part of others (Barry 1995: 99). Just 
agreements will arise from informed deliberation of the consequences and rules that 
no one could reasqnably reject and the justification of outcomes will be openly arrived 
at (Barry 1995). Amy Gutmann (1999) reinforces this notion and suggests that 
deliberation is the most satisfactory mechanism to resolve moral disputes. She 
believes that deliberation can lead to resolutions that have a greater chance of being 
morally defensible because it promotes mutual respect among equal citizens. 
To summarise, the Scanlonian construction places on the, negotiating parties the 
requirement that bargaining outcomes will be informed, unforced and reasonable. 
DeliberatioiY within a bargaining process ensures that the parties to the negotiation are 
fully informed. In these circumstances they can accept a reasoned argument. The right 
of each party to veto an unreasonable argument will ensure that the process will be un-
forced. 
In summary, the theory of JAI simply states that the 'rules of justice' as developed 
through bargaining must be reasonable. Barry compares his theory with that of Rawls 
by stating that "For Rawls, justice constrains the content of the good" while in the 
theory of Justice as Impartiality "justice constrains the pursuit of the good" (Barry 
1995: 57). 
Ba~y, therefore, replaces the Rawlsian original position with the Scanlonian 
·construction, a construction that satisfies the Rawlsian criterion of fairness but allows 
an effective negotiating environment to exist between two competing parties. 
The principles or 'rules of justice' that are reasonable (being those that are developed 
through reasoned argument) are deemed impartial because they: "capture a certain 
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kind of equality: all those affected have to be able to feel that they have done as well 
as they could reasonably hope to" (Barry 1995: 7). 
Barry summarises his theory of justice as impartiality by asking: 
What are the institutional arrangements most conducive to making outcomes depend 
on reasoned argument rather than on the alignment of political forces? 
Since JAI is the most satisfactory, and thus the most stable, for the parties involved it 
is chosen as the most appropriate theory to examine international mediation. 
IV Justice as Fairness 
The concept of justice as fairness within the political theories of justice has a 
particular meaning. For Rawls, in "A Theory of Justice" it meant the following: 
'Justice as fairness' it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fair. The name does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are the 
same, any more than the phrase "poetry as metaphor" means that the concepts of poetry and 
metaphor are the same (Rawls 1972: 12). 
Fairness within the theory of JAI is defined by the actual negotiating environment 
created by the theory: 
we can already begin to discern from this the outlines of the generic conception of fairness for 
which we now need to look. It will make fairness what can freely be agreed on by equally 
well-placed parties. Justice as impartiality-the theory of justice we arrive at by pursuing this 
idea .. .In rough terms, the criterion of just rules and institutions is that they should be fair, and 
the motive appealed to is the desire to behave fairly (Barry 1995: 51). 
In essence, Barry believes that two conditions need to be satisfied before an agreement 
will be fair. That the parties must be well informed and equally well placed to 
negotiate. This does not mean, however, that there must always be equal bargaining 
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power between the parties at the theoretical baseline. Rawls needed the parties' 
bargaining power or position to be equal, because the motive to be just within the 
negotiation environment was self-interest, which does not allow the regulation of 
social co-operation other than what is in one's own long term self-interest. 
In the context of JAI, the parties will only need to be equally well placed at the 
negotiation baseline. This means that the parties will still seek to advance their 
interests but will limit their demands to what is reasonable. A non-agreement point 
must still exist to motivate the parties to commence negotiations and to establish the 
bargaining position, but for a negotiated agreement to be fair the parties must be 
motivated by a desire to reach agreement on reasonable terms. The parties cannot 
rely on their pre-negotiation positions to justify their argument. Therefore, the 
conditions established under JAI will provide outcomes that will be just and fair for 
the mediating parties because acting fairly reinforces fair behaviour: 
Justice as Impartiality, however, has the structure of an assurance game. If I am motivated by a 
desire to behave fairly, I will want to do what the rules mandated by Justice as Impartiality 
require so long as enough other people are doing the same. Thus, people motivated by fairness 
reinforce one another's motives (Barry 1995: 51). 
Incorporating the Social-Psychological Categories of Justice 
We have seen that a criterion of the Scanlonian construction is that the parties have to 
feel that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope to, which in theory 
would ensure that the cognitive need for participants and their constituents to believe 
that an outcome is fair has been met. This cognitive or psychological need by 
participants to a mediation event has been the basis for the assessment of justice in the 
majority of the literature on mediation. The literature considers fairness within the 
mediation context by using various social-psychology developed categories of justice 
that have been adopted for participant viewpoints. 
The construct of fairness within the theory of justice developed by Barry automatically 
ensures that the requirements for fairness represented by these established categories 
29 
of justice are met. JAI produces a stable agreement, because, if the parties' perception 
is that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope to, then the various 
categories of justice described above become subsumed by this requirement The 
argument, for instance, about whether the distribution of resources should be based on 
equity, where rewards should be distributed in proportion to their contributions, as 
opposed to equality, where all parties receive an equal share of goods or on a 
distribution based primarily on need, is not necessary. The negotiating environment 
produced by the Scanlon construction will automatically produce a fair distribution 
because it will ensure that the allocation of resources will be in such a manner that all 
parties · will feel that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope to. 
Furthermore, those who are most affected have the ability to veto any agreement and 
those who are most likely to have reasonable objections will be those who are most 
affected by an outcome (Barry 1998). 
Likewise, if the mediated agreement is fair, it has been freely agreed to by equally 
well-placed parties. This means that the procedures will automatically be fair within 
this environment because prejudicial procedures create unequal bargaining positions. 
Interactional justice (the right to social sensitivity) will also exist within a Scanlonian 
construction because the common standard of reasonableness requires that parties in 
their motivation to be fair will respect such conditions. If one party is not respected 
then they will consider that they have not done as well as they could reasonably hope. 
JAI promotes the idea that justice as fairness is the way the negotiation process takes 
place. Whether or not a negotiated agreement is fair is according to this conception is 
dependant on the negotiation environment. Consequently, there is no need to place an 
outside criteria of fairness onto the parties' decision, so long as the decision-making 
process has been fair in terms of JAI. What is fair is determined by the pruties 
themselves in a negotiation environment where the parties are well informed, well 
placed, and the agreement has been reached freely. This approach overcomes the 
problem of conflicting standards for outcome fairness in mediation. 
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V Reasonableness in International Mediation 
It has been established in the theory of JAI that fairness is developed within the 
negotiating environment by the parties' desire to behave fairly. This desire to behave 
fairly will ensure that the parties limit their demands to what is reasonable, in other 
words, demands that can be justified by reasoned argument. As explained, previously, 
Barry suggests that interdependence requires people to consider the reasonableness of 
their actions in light of others. In terms of international mediation parties realise that 
negotiated agreements need to be supported by their constituents, which provides 
another layer of interdependence. Without constituent support there is little chance an 
agreement will be implemented. 
There is anecdotal evidence within international mediation that reasonableness does 
exist in a format similar to that prescribed by the theory of JAI. An example can be 
found in Princen's analysis of Jimmy Carter's thoughts about Camp David: 
My colleagues and I decided to develop a reasonable proposal.... hoping that public opinion 
and the general desire for peace might be decisive" .... In other words, from Carter's 
perspective, the public knows that peace transcends all else and when he can fmally bring 
Begin to this realisation, agreement will be in hand. Reasonable people may dis-agree, but a 
'reasonable proposal' cannot readily be rejected (Princen 1982: 291). 
The discussion between Golda Meir and Henry Kissinger repeated below also 
illustrates how reasonableness in negotiations can be the basis of support for a 
mediated agreement: 
Meir: none of our neighbours- certainly not Syria- is prepared to negotiate real peace. All 
the Syrians want to talk about after two wars in six years is the engagement of forces- so we 
cannot just brush aside the military arguments of our chief of staff. Besides, regimes change in 
the Arab world. Suppose something happens to Sadat and someone more anti-Israel and pro-
Soviet comes to power? What happens then to all these agreements? 
Kissinger: In that case a great deal would depend on how reasonable Israel has been in 
negotiations. Meir: We did not just get up one day in 1967 after all the shelling from the 
Heights and decide to take Golan away from them. In October we had 800 killed and 2000 
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wounded in Golan alone- in a war they started. They say this is their territory. Eight hundred 
boys gave their lives for an attack the Syrians started. Assad lost the war-and now we have to 
pay for it because Assad says it is his territory! 
Kissinger: Each side has its own definition of justice. Remember what this is all about- to keep 
the negotiating process alive, to prevent another round of hostilities, which would benefit the 
Soviet Union and increase pressure on you, on us, and on Sadat to rejoin the battle ... (Sheehan 
1989: 68). 
Kissinger states how important it is to be 'reasonable' and then goes on to say that 
justice is subjective. In this sense he is talking about just outcomes through 
negotiation, while in the second he is talking about how people describe or interpret 
specific events in terms of justice. 
An another example can be found during the Oslo Back Channel negotiations where 
the Palestinian delegate Abbu Alaa stated: Your obstinacy is to no avail, we must sit 
around the table. Here is our voice calling out to you; listen to the voice of reason, 
look to the future of your children (Mahmoud Abbas 1995: 7). 
In summary, the conditions established through the Scanlonian construction in the 
theory of JAI will automatically provide outcomes that will be fair for the mediating 
parties and their constituents even in terms of the social-psychological categories of 
justice. The fairness of a mediated agreement is developed from a just negotiation 
environment in terms of the theory of JAI. The theory of JAI provides an argument to 
suggest that in an assessment of the fairness of a mediated agreement, emphasis can 
be placed on the process of mediation. Outcome fairness and the participant view of · 
such fairness will, in justice theory, follow on from a just negotiation environment. 
VI Justice as Impartiality and Nation States 
International mediation is focused on the resolution of conflicts that has occurred in, 
or between, states, so in order to apply a fully developed theory of justice to 
international mediation we must first determine whether states can indeed regulate 
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their behaviour to produce just agreements. For sovereign states to have the capacity 
to freely negotiate a 'reasonable agreement' with each other or with non-state actors, 
there must be some element of moral motivation in their behaviour to pursue such an 
outcome. Essentially, as stated by Barry, moral motivation is "a psychological 
phenomenon rather than a logical one" (Barry 1991: 179). It has been shown that there 
is anecdotal evidence to suggest that parties will be reasonable during the bargaining 
process, but does this translate to a motivation to be moral? 
Nation State Morality 
It is argued that states (through the notion of sovereignty) have a paramount duty to 
their citizens that over-rides any duty to another state, and this is especially so in times 
of conflict (Teson 1998). It could be assumed, from this idea, that state morality is 
different to individual morality and that relations between states are not subject to 
individual moral· standards. Barry argues against state amorality by comparing it with 
a lower level of abstraction. A person, he maintains, has a special obligation to his 
family, a duty that exceeds his obligation to his neighbour. This obligation, however, 
does not justify or legitimatise harm to his neighbour in order to benefit his family. 
Similary, a state cannot justify, or does not have 
moral licence to do anything to advance the national interest without regard to possible 
violation of the legitimate interests of others ... Why should this one level of association be 
exempted from moral constraints that apply to all others? (Barry 199: 165). 
Teson (1998) agrees with Barry suggesting that a morality does not exist that is 
peculiar to international relations: 
It is of course true that government officials face peculiar 'conditions' in foreign policy. 
However, that does not mean that they operate, or should operate, under a different logic, 
morality or rationality (Teson 1998: 42) .. 
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A second argument that attempts to dispute the idea that morality exists between 
states is that rules of international conduct cannot truly exist because there is no 
common social cohesion between states. Each state observes rules out of choice, so 
they are not members of a community governed by 'common rules of conduct' (Nadin 
1983). Barry argues, oppositely, that in everyday life moral norms are not always 
backed by legal sanction nor are they universal but are still effective in controlling 
behaviour. Likewise, Kant believed that international order should be no different to 
the national order and that the desire to maintain reason over a 'state of nature' exists 
equally in the international arena as it does within states and this was proven by states 
attempting to justify their behaviour in terms of laws: 
The homage that every nation pays to the concept of law proves ... that there is in man a still 
greater, though presently dormant moral aptitude to master the evil principle in himself and to 
hope that others will also overcome it (Kant 1795: 116). 
The Level of Moral Motivation by Nation States 
Although it has been demonstrated that moral motivation can, and indeed should, 
exist between states (because what exists between individuals within states should not 
be different to what exists between states), it must be accepted that the moral 
motivation of the international community is less than what exists within domestic 
community structures. States are less interdependent so there is less social cohesion 
between them than in domestic structures. However, not having a strong moral 
climate does not suggest that the conduct of foreign policy should preclude or justify 
future behaviour that would promote the development of reasonable agreements by 
states (Nadin 1983). 
The theory of JAI does not describe or predict international relations between states. It 
is a non-prescriptive theory of justice that provides a litmus test to determine the 
justice of agreements. It does not try to make presumptions from the theory to 
represent reality. It is a theory that enables us to determine whether the behaviour of 
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states is just. Therefore, the level of moral motivation of states is unimportant to the 
theory of J AI. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified various political theories of justice put forward by Brian 
Barry. It showed why the theory of JAI should be the key political theory of justice to 
explain what should motivate parties within a political bargaining process to be just. 
The theoretical building block for the theory JAI is the Scanlonian construction. That 
construction allows Barry to assert that an agreement will only be just in terms of JAI 
if the parties are infonned, have freely agreed to it, and that it could not be reasonably 
rejected by the parties. Barry believes that in applying this construction the principles 
of justice developed will be fair because the agreement has been freely agreed to by 
equally well-placed parties. 
The theory of JAI suggests that being infonned means that the parties are capable of 
recognising reasonable objections on the part of others and reasonableness is what 
can be agreed to by reasoned argument. Fairness is what is determined by parties, 
themselves, when they are infonned and equally well placed within the negotiation 
environment. A just negotiation environment for international mediation in terms of 
the theory of JAI is therefore: 
Where a mediating State's behaviour is such that it will not use an alignment of 
political forces to make the parties reach a specific agreement, but rather will 
assist the parties to freely negotiate an informed agreement based on reasoned 
argument. 
This study will now proceed to examine international mediation in the context of the 
political theory of justice, JAI. Consequently, the definitions 'informed', 'reasonable' 
and 'fair' and the phrase 'just negotiation environment' are those developed in this 
chapter. 
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3 INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AND JUSTICE 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however 
elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no 
matter how efficient and well arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. 
JOHN RAWLS- A theory of Justice 
/Introduction 
The theory of JAI provides an hypothesis on the sort of negotiation climate that 
should exist before a set of rules can be developed that are fair. 
Justice is, of course, a moral concept: it is wrong to behave unjustly because that is to breach 
the terms of fair agreement for mutual constraint. However, justice as impartiality provides the 
ground rules that set the legitimate limits to the pursuit of any particular moral system's 
precepts ...... For justice as impartiality is not designed to tell us how to live. It addresses itself 
to a different but equally important question: how are we to live together, given that we have 
different ideas about how to live (Barry 1995: 77). 
The theories of justice that have been examined in this thesis were originally 
developed to evaluate the fundamental relationships that are formed within societies. 
In JAI impartial rules that are supposed to emerge from the Scanlonian contract are 
intended to provide a way members of a society can live together with competing 
conceptions of the good (Weale 1998). 
This thesis contends that the political theory of justice, JAI, developed by Barry can 
be applied in certain circumstances to the political process of international mediation. 
This assumption is based on the idea that international mediation has the capacity to: 
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1. Affect basic political rights- how people live within their nation in relation to each 
other; and 
2. Establish a framework to prevent the onset of conflict between societies. i.e. the 
Rules of Justice. 
The Oslo Accords are one example of this. Stage One of the accords involved interim 
self-government arrangements that affected the basic human rights of the Palestinian 
People. The Gaza Jericho Agreement involved the establishment of legislative powers 
to the Palestinian Authority. Article VII states that: "The Palestinian Authority will 
have the power, within its jurisdiction, to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, 
laws, regulations and other legislative acts." 
Furthermore, it has been argued in this thesis that states have the theoretical capacity 
to be reasonable in the conduct of their relations with other states even if, such 
motivations often are not primary. If nation states, and therefore, the representative 
participants to a mediation event, have the theoretical ability to be motivated morally, 
and mediation events involve the negotiation of structures and rules to prevent the 
onset of conflict, then an examination of international mediation in terms of the theory 
of JAI is warranted. It may be suggested that because mediation is voluntary in 
participation and compliance and not part of a formal institutional process (that 
attaches or enforces benefits and burdens), it is precluded from an assessment in terms 
of the political theories of justice. However, one of the important points in Barry's 
theory of JAI is that he does not distinguish between rules that are enforced by the 
state and rules that are upheld voluntarily (Barry 1998). 
International mediation is a political process (Touval and Zartman 1984: 7) where 
political rights are affected and parties develop rules that are necessary to avoid 
conflict. Consequently, international mediation, as outlined in Chapter Two, ought to 
be examined in terms of a political theory of justice. This chapter will examine the 
behaviour of a mediator in the triadic negotiation environment of international 
mediation to see how such behaviour affects a just negotiation environment in terms 
of JAI and will examine the motivation of mediators within this bargaining process to 
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determine how mediators should behave in the delivery of their functions to 
conflicting parties. 
II Applying JAI to International Mediation Theory 
This thesis has identified the conditions needed for a just negotiation environment in 
terms of JAI. Using the Scanlonian construction as a litmus test or standard, a 
negotiation climate can be demonstrated as just if the negotiating behaviour of the 
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parties allows an agreed outcome that is informed, unforced that could not be 
reasonably rejected by the parties. 
However, to apply this theory to international mediation, there must be an 
understanding of how the introduction of a third party distinguishes mediation from a 
dyadic negotiation environment. The difference for the purposes of thesis, between 
applying JAI to a mediation, rather than a negotiation, is that the mediator's behaviour 
affects the negotiating environment. The actions of mediator must therefore be part of 
any evaluation of the justice of mediation. 
Bercovitch describes mediation as "a dynamic and complex social process comprising 
,parties in dispute, a social environment or a context, a particular dispute or problem, 
and a mediating agent" (Bercovitch 1996: 13). As a dynamic social process a 
mediation event will be altered by the context in which it occurs. The contingency 
approach will be introduced to provide a descriptive format of the international 
mediation process. This approach illustrates how contextual factors affect the 
mediation process. The most relevant to the negotiation environment is mediator 
behaviour: "In essence, the practice of mediation revolves around the choice of 
strategic behaviour th.at mediators believe will facilitate the type of outcome they seek 
to achieve in the conflict management process" (Bercovitch and Houston 2000: 174). 
Therefore, the kind negotiation environment that exists in the triadic negotiation 
environment of international mediation is contingent on mediator behaviour. The 
contingency model of mediation behaviour illustrated below clearly demonstrates this. 
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Commenting on this model Bercovitch and Houston (2000) state: "It is the interaction 
of these three contextual dimensions, comprising actors and situation conditions, that 
influence how mediator behaviour is chosen and implemented and thus the outcome 
of the mediation process" (Bercovitch and Houston 2000: 173). In the contingency 
approach, mediator strategies are divided into three categories based on the level of 
intervention undertaken by the mediator. These categories are described by Bercovitch 
and Houston (2000) as: 
1. Communication-facilitation strategies describe mediator behaviour at the low end of the 
intervention spectrum. The mediator typically adopts a passive role, channelling information to 
39 
the parties, facilitating co-operation but exhibiting little control over the more formal process 
or substance of mediation. 
2. Procedural strategies enable a mediator to exert more formal control over the mediation 
process with r:espect to the environment of the mediation. The mediator may determine the 
structural aspects of meetings and control constituency influences, media publicity, the 
distribution of information, and the situation powers of the parties' resources and 
communication processes. 
3. Directive strategies are the most powerful form of intervention. The mediator affects the 
content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties to 
negotiate or by issuing ultimatums. Directive strategies deal directly with and aim to change 
the way issues are framed and the behaviour associated with them (Bercovitch and Houston 
2000: 175). 
Mediators use these strategies to influence the parties' behaviour in the negotiation 
environment. The different kinds of negotiation environment that develop from the 
introduction of a mediator will now be examined, as well as the theoretical basis of 
mediation, to determine if international mediation is conducive to developing the kind 
of negotiation environment envisaged in terms of JAI. 
A Bargaining Process that is Informed and Unforced 
In JAI, parties must be informed. Deliberation on the consequences of any outcome 
where the parties are capable of recognising reasonable objections on the part of 
others is necessary to ensure that parties make agreements on reasoned argument 
rather than on their own values system (Barry 1995). Justifications for arguments must 
be openly arrived at so that each party can recognise the reasonable objections of the 
other. Procedures that encourage deliberation within a negotiation environment will 
provide this. Gutmann (1999) has developed the idea of deliberation as a mechanism 
for the resolution of moral disputes. She describes deliberation as "the value given to 
engaging in a give and take of arguments and understandings before making a 
decision" (Gutmann 1999: 2). Gutmann believes that deliberation needs to be not only 
about outcomes, but also about process. 
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International mediation needs to incorporate a process of deliberation so that the 
consequences of an agreement can be openly identified and justified by reasoned 
argument if it is to create a just negotiation environment in terms of JAI. The 
theoretical concept of mediation is conducive to such deliberation. The introduction of 
the third party is supposed to facilitate discussion. There is no formal process that 
inhibits the disclosure of information or invites the risk of penalty from such 
disclosure. Participation in mediation is voluntary so, in theory at least, the parties can 
deliberate on the procedural mechanisms prior to the commencement of negotiations. 
In sum, there is no reason why a deliberative framework could not be developed 
within the mediation process as a mechanism that would enable a moral resolution of 
conflicts in both procedure and substance. 
As stated in Chq.pter Two, for the outcome to be unforced the parties should not enter 
into an agreement simply because they would be better off than if the agreement had 
not existed in the first place, or out of fear of the consequences from not reaching an 
agreement. In theory, mediation, as a voluntary social process, provides an ideal 
framework for a just negotiation environment. However, by being a dynamic social 
process and not rule based, a mediator has the opportunity to affect the conditions for 
a just negotiation environment in terms of JAI. The mediator in an international 
mediation is sometimes in a position where he is capable of making threats and may 
have the ability to change the threat advantage of the negotiating parties. 
Kleiboer (1996) has categorised the approach taken by international mediators into 
four 'proto-theories': 
1. re-establishing social relationships; 
2. political problem solving; 
3. domination; and 
4. power brokerage. 
The first proto-theory is based on the view that mediation should be transformative, 
which means that the process is more important than the outcome. The goal of the 
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mediator is to promote new attitudes and skills that can be used to solve not only the 
present conflict but future conflicts as well (Baruch-Bush and Folger 1994). In this 
type of mediation the mediator should "be a skilful actor with no stake in the conflict 
but with an ideological commitment to social change for a more humane world 
society" (Kleiboer 1996: 382). An effective power of veto would operate to empower 
the parties. Empowerment is considered one of the most important elements in this 
type of mediation: "The real opportunity to reject a settlement and go elsewhere is 
what guarantees fairness in mediation, and empowerment ensures this opportunity is 
real" (Barush-Bush, and Folger: 270). 
The second proto-theory - closely aligned to transformative mediation - is political 
problem solving. Kleiboer states that in this type of mediation the mediator should 
"enhance the process of building trust between the opposing parties" (Kleiboer 1996: 
;381). 
Leverage by a mediator takes place within this framework but is process-orientated. 
Fisher and Ury (1987) are proponents of this theory and advocate mediation as a 
process of diagnosis, where solutions can be formulated that will ensure a 'win-win' 
outcome. The objective is to solve issues so that agreements can be made. Mediation 
strategies for these two styles would involve use of communicative and facilitative 
mediation strategies. Behavioural techniques used by the mediator only affect how 
communication takes place and will not affect the actual decision making of the 
parties other than to provide the necessary interpretative tools and environment that 
will promote such decision-making. Consequently, strategies of political problem 
solving mediator would not detrimentally affect the just negotiation environment in 
terms of JAI.. 
Procedural strategies, similarly, do not affect the negotiation environment. The 
behavioural tactics employed have a greater influence by controlling procedural 
aspects of the mediation, but the specific behavioural tactics used within this category 
would not be sufficient for the mediator to influence the outcome. Baruch-Bush and 
Folger (1994) believe there is a tendency, however, for the use of leverage to develop 
into the use of directive strategies. For instance, a mediator could be in a position to 
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limit information flows to prevent an informed decision. Unless there was a 
reasonable argument by the mediator that the information should not be disclosed, 
then non-disclosure could affect a just negotiation environment. 
The last two mediation styles discussed by Kleiboer are power brokerage and 
mediation as domination. The mediator will have the power to exert considerable 
leverage over the parties and have, especially under mediation through domination, 
the power to manipulate parties into accepting a specific settlement. The negotiating 
environment changes to one that severely limits the ability of the parties to be 
informed and outcomes may be forced onto the parties. This type of mediation 
involves the use of directive strategies to pressure or manipulate parties into a specific 
solution. The objective of the mediator in his use of specific behavioural tactics 
associated with directive strategies is to change or influence the outcome of the 
negotiation. Directive strategies have been defined in the mediation literature as 
"strategies by which the mediator actively promotes a specific solution or attempts to 
pressure the parties directly into ending the dispute" (Kressel1972: 67). 
Within the mediation literature use of tactics to advance the goals of the mediator is 
known as 'power mediation'. Generally, power mediation is undertaken by a state that 
has the capacity to implement a political process characterised by directive strategies 
such as leverage, rewarding the party's concessions, pressing the parties to show 
flexibility and promising resources or threatening withdrawal in order to obtain 
specific outcomes (Touval and Zartman 1985). It is doubtful that a mediator who 
promotes specific outcomes by way of directive strategies can create a just negotiation 
environment in terms of JAI. The participants will be forced into accepting an 
outcome, which has been negotiated by a political process that does not take into 
account any reasonable objections the parties may have. 
43 
Ill Specific Strategies that Affect a Just Negotiation 
Environment. 
The role of the mediator in the theory of JAI .is not to address the imbalance of power 
between the parties at the beginning or during the bargaining process, but rather to 
assist the parties so that they are equally well placed to negotiate based on reasoned 
argument. This means that the mediator himself must be reasonable when he is 
dealing with the parties. An assessment of the specific behavioural techniques (as 
listed in appendix I) reveals three major categories of behaviour within the repertoire 
of directive strategies that would affect a just negotiation environment in terms of JAI 
if used in the context of power mediation. These are: supply and filter of information; 
concession giving; and the promising or threatening withdrawal resources. 
Supply and Filter of Information. 
In the negotiation environment it is possible that the mediator will face a choice 
between the manipulation of the negotiation environment through the control of 
information and ensuring full information is provided to the parties. In negotiation 
literature deception has been defined as a deliberate attempt by one party to present 
incorrect information or to conceal or misrepresent information vital to a transaction. 
It includes such things as selectively disclosing information, mis-representing one's 
position and constructing arguments that lead an opposing party to a wrong 
conclusion. (Aquino1998; Lewicki 1983). Laboratory studies have shown that the use 
of information by a party within a negotiation framework can affect outcomes: "The 
results corroborate previous studies showing that the ability to control and manipulate 
information is a significant source of power in negotiation" (Aquino 1998: 212). 
Within the above definition of deception the tactical use of information by a mediator 
would be deception. Deception in the context of mediation is, however, different to a 
dyadic negotiation. It is a generally held belief that the motivation for deception 
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within a dyadic negotiation framework is based on self-interest (Aquino 1998). It is 
common sense to assume this as benefits accrue to each party directly by their actions. 
However, in the triadic relation of international mediation the motivation to deceive 
by a third party is less clear. In the first instance, it would seem that the use of 
deception by a mediator could at times be acceptable because the mediator does not 
always have an interest in the outcome. A motivation to deceive could be what is in 
the best interests of the parties. However, it cannot always be assumed that mediators 
act in the best interest of the parties. Furthermore, no matter what the intentions of the 
mediator are, care must always be taken by a mediator to ensure that the integrity of 
the process is maintained no matter what the circumstances. Research on dyadic 
negotiation structures has illustrated the importance of acting ethically within the 
negotiation environment. For example, an empirical basis was established for the 
claim that the presence of ethical standards encouraged members within an 
organisational framework to deal more honestly with each other (Aquino: 1998). A 
mediator who acts ethically may encourage similar behaviour from the parties. 
Deception by a medi~tor, however could have the opposite effect. In the words of the 
Eighteenth century diplomat, Francois de Calli~res, 
It is a capital error, which prevails widely that a clever negotiator must be a master in the art of 
deceit... no doubt the art of lying has been practiced with success in diplomacy, but unlike 
honesty ... A lie always leaves a drop of poison behind, and even the most dazzling diplomatic 
success gained by dishonesty stands on an insecure foundation, for it awakes in the defeated 
party a sense of aggravation, a desire for vengeance, and a hatred, which must always be a 
menace to his foe ( de Callieres 1716). 
Within the context of JAI parties should be free to deliberate on how information 
should be controlled. Deception involves non-disclosure making free deliberation 
impossible. Non-disclosure of information could only be justified if there was a 
reasoned argument to prevent disclosure. As illustrated in dyadic research, control of 
information is a significant source of power in negotiations, so mediators must ensure 
that there is a reasonable disclosure of information to the parties. 
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Concession Giving; and the Offer and Threat of Withdrawal of 
Resources. 
The way parties' bargain has been examined extensively in the negotiation literature. 
Negotiation theory has developed two theoretical constructs to categorise bargaining 
behaviour. These are, integrative and distributive bargaining. Distributive bargaining 
is defined in the literature as: "a hypothetical construct referring to the complex 
system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party's goal when they are in 
basic conflict with those of the other party" (Walton and Me Kersie 1968: 4).. 
Integrative bargaining is defined as: "the system of activities which is instrumental to 
the attainment of objectives which is not in fundamental conflict with those of the 
other party and which therefore can be integrated" (Walton and Me Kersie 1968: 5). It 
has been argued in the literature that both types of bargaining exist in international 
negotiations (Beriker-Atiyas 1995). Distributive solutions result in loss for one party. 
For integrative solutions both parties' needs are met by bargaining techniques such as: 
expanding the pie; non-specific compensation; and bridging. In terms of JAI these 
categories are somewhat irrelevant. Integrative and distributive solutions may be 
found in negotiations but they are only descriptive of techniques used and do not 
explain the underlying motive for their use. In JAI, the parties will seek to advance 
their own interests, but should limit their demands for concessions to what is 
reasonable. Concessions by a party should not be made on the grounds that a return to 
the non-agreement position is untenable or by a threat from the opposing party or for 
that matter, the mediator. In addition, the mediator should not encourage parties to 
give concessions on this basis and the mediator should only reward the parties for 
concessions when it is reasonable to do so. 
The mediator will have at times the ability to change the party's negotiation positions 
by promising resources or threatening the withdrawal of resources. For example, 
power mediation enables a mediator to alter how well placed the parties are within the 
negotiation environment. As Kissinger stated, 
when I ask Rabin to make concessions he says he cannot because Israel is weak. Therefore, I 
give him more arms, and then he says he doesn't need to make concessions because Israel is 
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strong; immense arms shipments to Israel was naive- my biggest mistake (Quoted in Sheehan 
1976: 66). 
Often a power mediator will attempt to equalise the bargaining position of the parties 
to ensure that one does not dominate the other. There is nothing wrong with this, per 
se, and it may have the effect of encouraging the parties to be fair to each other in 
their negotiations if their bargaining power is restricted. However, being equally well 
placed is an attitude. Each party must have a desire to behave fairly no matter what 
their bargaining strength is. As illustrated above, if the mediator supports one party 
only, then this may encourage the use of bargaining strength within negotiations. 
Therefore, to promote a just negotiation environment in terms of JAI, the mediator 
must seek to ensure that concessions made by the parties are reasonable. How the 
parties negotiate does not matter as long as they are not using their own bargaining 
strength to obtain concessions and the mediator is pursuing an objective of ensuring 
that the parties are equally well-placed in the negotiation environment. 
IV The Moral Motivation of the Mediator 
The motivation of a mediator in terms of JAI is to ensure that the parties make a 
decision on the basis of reasoned argument. In addition, the mediator must show to the 
parties that his suggestions are based on reasoned argument rather than his own 
political alignment. It would seem in first instance that a mediator does not stand to 
gain materially (other than reputation) from an agreement reached between the parties, 
so the motivation of the mediator would always reflect what is in the best interests of 
the parties. However, mediators will have a bias to their own state's interest and can 
have a motivation that is different to the negotiating parties: 
Mediation should not be confused with altruism; mediators are usually cognizant of their own 
interests and they have the motives, consciously expressed or not, that they wish to see 
promoted or protected (Bercovi.tch 1996: 9). 
There are instances in international mediation where the mediator attempts to 
influence the negotiation process for his own state's interests. Henry Kissinger's 
shuttle diplomacy during the Arab- Israel conflict has been judged by scholars to be an 
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example where the interests of the mediator's state were placed ahead of the 
negotiating states' interests. 
His priority goal was not to bring justice or a durable peace to the Middle East, but to produce 
a personal success so that, in theory, at some later time he could do something more important. 
His concern was to have USA look the driver and therefore hindered direct negotiations 
between General Yariv and General Gamasy of Egypt. Kissinger wanted to demonstrate that 
the United States role was essential for sustained diplomatic progress (Quandt 1977: 102). 
Clearly, in international mediation, there can exist a motivation of self-interest within 
the bargaining process. However, there are also instances where mediators believe that 
they are motivated by a sense of morality. This is important to JAI because a desire to 
be morally motivated needs to exist before an examination of morality can take place 
(Barry 1991). 
During the Oslo Back Channel negotiations, the parties' believed that the mediators 
were predominantly motivated by a desire to resolve the conflict itself: 
Thus to attribute the concern they showed to a desire for personal political credit or enhanced 
international reputation for their country is clearly not right. We sensed an inner motivation 
and a real desire to bring peace about in the Middle East (Mahmoud Abbas 1995: 104). 
Similarly, in Dayton, Holbrooke believed that the United States was motivated by 
morality and humanitarianism: "Strategic considerations were vital to our 
involvement, but the motives that finally pushed the United States into action were 
also moral and humanitarian" (Holbrooke 1998 : 359). 
This illustrates that there is a motivation by mediators to be moral, but there is still a 
need to constrain the pursuit of the good. Barry believes that the conditions under JAI 
will provide this. Therefore, once sufficient constraint has been exercised by a desire 
to be just within the negotiation environment of JAI the outcomes of a mediated 
agreement will be fair. As explained, the fairness of a mediated agreement is what the 
parties themselves decide flS fair, as long as there is a desire to be just within the 
negotiation framework. Therefore, mediators using directive strategies to force an 
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outcome on the parties, no matter what their motivation, must be aware that they are 
creating the conditions for the negotiation environment of mediation to be unjust. 
VA Moral Dilemma 
If the position of the mediator and the use of directive strategies enables a mediator to 
reach a settlement, should he use such strategies to settle the dispute even though it 
may affect the just negotiation environment in terms of JAI? Specifically, should a 
'power mediator' undertake the use of directive strategies to force a specific outcome 
on the parties to end a conflict? This question returns us to the age-old ethical 
dilemma of Machiavelli; does the end justify the means? 
Empirical research undertaken by Bercovitch and associates has concluded that 
directive strategies have led to greater instances of success in mediation: 
Mediators employing directive or substantive strategies are successful, on average, 41% of the 
time. Mediation strategies that can prod the adversaries, and strategies that allow mediators to 
introduce new issues, suggest new ways of seeing the dispute or alter the motivational structure 
of the parties, are more positively associated with successful outcomes than any other type of 
intervention (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 199: 16). 
In later research, directive strategies were found to be particularly effective for short-
term solutions: 
Directive strategies, on the other hand, are important in the short term through the 
implementation of immediate cease-fires and appear to be more significant in lengthy, 
protracted mediation efforts in which the parties may need to be guided in stages on 
substantive issues to achieve a settlement (Bercovitch and Houston 2000: 192). 
Peachey (1989) supports mediator intervention for inter-personal conflict because the 
introduction of a third party will fundamentally change the negotiating process, which 
necessitates an active role by the mediator: 
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My comments here imply that it is ethically acceptable for a mediator to encourage disputants 
to seek and accept a certain range of outcomes (especially settlements other than retribution). 
Some might argue, however, that to do so is outside the bounds of acceptable mediator 
behaviour because the mediator is departing from the role of manager of the process and is 
beginning to shape the outcome to which the parties will agree. I would reply that there can 
never be a dichotomy between ends and means. By my choice to enter a conflict situation as a 
mediator (rather than other roles such as advocate, judge, or vigilante) I am necessarily 
presenting a bias for a certain range of outcomes (Peachey 1989: 316). 
In international mediation, the lives of people are at stake so the context of 
negotiations must colour the ethical considerations of the mediator. No one would 
blame a mediator for acting in a manner that could be described as un-ethical 
behaviour when the motivation is to limit bloodshed by seeking short-term solutions. 
It does seem acceptable that a mediator should use any means possible to end a 
conflict in international mediation. 
However, even though the consequences of failure may be bloodshed, there may be 
worse results in the future if the participants feel that their political rights have been 
detrimentally affected. JAI makes the assumption that in these circumstances the 
stability of any agreement would be in question because the parties who were affected 
would not feel that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope to (Barry 
1995). In fact, there may be serious moral issues abopt seeking an end to hostilities at 
any cost when the cessation of hostilities may not necessarily reflect or be the most 
satisfactory alternative: 
However, the BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) may still be a morally 
better response than continued negotiations- to a ruthless tyrant, for example, who has 
demonstrated that he is intent on engaging in ethnic cleansing unless he is forcibly prevented 
from doing so. An immoral negotiated resolution to a moral conflict in politics may be worse 
than going to war or no resolution at all (Gutmann 1999: 8). 
The purpose of the theory of JAI is to provide a standard for the behaviour of the 
parties in the political bargaining process· so that impartial rules will develop that will 
enable people to live together because they have freely agreed to these rules. The 
purpose of JAI is not to assess the mediator in terms of whether a mediator should 
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take whatever means necessary to prevent bloodshed. However, a mediator should 
know how such actions will affect the negotiation environment if he is concerned 
about the protection of political rights of the constituents to the mediation, 
notwithstanding the consequences of failure, and JAI delivers this. 
A situation that poses a moral dilemma that to the theory of JAI is where a party freely 
negotiates an agreement with a ruthless tyrant. Under the theory of JAI no agreement 
can be made that affects the political rights of a party without their involvement. The 
strongest party will need the support of the party who has been most affected as this 
party can use a power of veto if it is reasonable to do so (Barry 1998). No party would 
agree to an outcome by a ruthless tyrant who wanted to seriously affect their rights. 
However, an interesting question arises if a party freely agrees to enter into an 
agreement with a tyrant who had previously been involved in, say, ethnic cleansing of 
the constituents to a mediation. This notion is morally repugnant. In terms of the 
theory of JAI there is no real answer to this question. It would be hard to imagine how 
a party could reach an agreement on reasoned argument with a tyrant who had been 
involved in ethnic cleansing, as it would be reasonable to assume such behaviour 
could occur in the future. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of an analysis of international mediation in terms of the theory of JAI is 
to develop concepts so that we can understand and know what justice should look like 
within the context of international mediation. This thesis is not so concerned about 
whether or not the outcomes of a mediation process are fair, because it asserts that 
fairness is what the parties themselves consider as fair within a just negotiation 
environment. Specifically, this chapter has shown how JAI can be applied to 
international mediation and how certain mediator behaviour can affect a just 
negotiation environment in terms of JAI. A moral dilemma does exist for a mediator if 
he is in a position to force an agreement onto the parties when such an agreement may 
prevent bloodshed but would be in contravention of the behavioural requirements of 
JAI. However, the theory of JAI shows how a mediator should behave so that stable, 
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just agreements are made between parties. An agreement that is made where the 
parties are not satisfied is unjust in terms of the theory of JAI, and may not be any 
better at preventing bloodshed. Indeed, morally an unjust agreement may be no better 
than no agreement at all. 
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4 EVALUATIVE CRITERIA FOR JUSTICE IN 
MEDIATION. 
This chapter develops an evaluative criteria so that a specific international mediation 
event can be assessed in terms of a political theory of justice. These criteria will show 
how a just negotiation environment can be identified and how actual mediator 
behaviour can affect that environment. Mediation is contingent on mediator 
behaviour. The type of behavioural strategies undertaken by the mediator (mediator 
style) is the variable that is responsible for the different kinds of negotiation 
environment in mediation. The evaluative criteria must identify, therefore, the 
mediator behaviour which are in keeping with a just negotiating environment of JAI. 
For a mediator to encourage a just negotiation environment, he must know how to 
achieve such an environment in the first place. The following criteria have been 
developed in an attempt to assist in this purpose. Below are a set of questions that this 
thesis suggests should be asked if a mediation event is to be evaluated in terms of 
justice as prescribed for in the theory of J AI 
1. Were there pre-conditions placed on the framework for negotiations? 
2. Were the parties free to deliberate on the procedures for the negotiations and the 
consequences of any outcome? 
3. vVere the parties equally well-placed in the negotiation environment? 
4. Did the mediation style involve the use of directive strategies to direct outcomes? 
5. Did the parties feel that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope? 
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1. Were there pre-conditions placed on the framework for 
negotiations? 
In first instance, the pre-conditions placed on a negotiation must be examined. This 
will determine if there have been any restrictions placed on the negotiating parties that 
could affect a just negotiation environment. Sometimes a party may place restrictions 
on who they will negotiate with. Although there can be a problem in mediation about 
who the legitimate representatives of a group are, the notion that one party should 
determine how the other party is to be represented is clearly not conducive to a just 
negotiation environment. One example is the Palestinian and Israeli conflict. In the 
Madrid conference held in 1991 Israel would only negotiate with Palestinians living in 
the administered areas (Peres: 1995). In this circumstance James Baker organised a 
'smoke-screen' through the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement where the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) was represented by this joint delegation. However, the 
PLO was not allowed, formally, to participate in the negotiations as representatives of 
the Palestinian people. Israel in effect, determined who the representatives of the 
Palestinians were. This clearly affected the attitude of the Palestinians: "we proved the 
sincerity of our intentions when we agreed to attend Madrid under unfair conditions" 
(Mahmoud Abbas 1995: 119). 
Often mediators impose pre-conditions to a negotiation environment as a negotiation 
tactic to avoid negotiations from becoming affected by historic grievances. However, 
as argued in this thesis, the parties must feel that they have done as well as they could 
reasonably hope to and without historic grievances being addressed it would be 
reasonable for the parties to feel that they have not done as well as they could hope to: 
A mediator or other third party observer may be frustrated by disputes that are entrenched in 
past grievances. But such a situation does not necessarily imply pettiness on the part of the 
disputants. Instead, mediators must maintain an awareness of the significance of justice when 
people have been wronged and explore with them ways that their sense of justice can be 
fulfilled (Peachey 1989: 316). 
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2. Were the parties free to deliberate on the procedures for the 
negotiation or the consequences of any outcome? 
The parties must be free to decide how they are to undertake negotiations. Restrictions 
imposed by a mediator must be freely agreed to between the parties. Parties must be in 
a position where there is informed deliberation about the negotiation environment and 
the consequences of any outcome. Where the parties are capable of recognising 
reasonable objections on the part of others, justifications for arguments would need to 
be openly arrived at so that the other party can recognise the reasonable objections. 
3. Were the parties equally well-placed in the negotiation 
environment? 
Not only must the parties be informed, they must not use the argument that they could 
do relatively well in the absence of an agreement and must not rely on their pre-
negotiation positions to justify their argument. The parties will still seek to advance 
their own interests, but must limit their demands to what is reasonable. 
4. Did the mediation style involve the use of directive strategies to 
direct outcomes? 
As already discussed in Chapter Three, the negotiation environment is contingent on 
the mediation style. If directive strategies are being employed by a mediator to force 
the parties into a specific outcome, then the conditions for a just negotiation 
environment has very little chance of being met. However, if such strategies are 
employed in an attempt to equalise the bargaining positions of the parties or to 
encourage parties to make concessions when they do not feel that it is necessary to do 
so (because of their existing bargaining strength) then such strategies are not unjust 
per se. Ultimately, in terms of JAI, it is the attitude of the parties that will determine if 
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the parties are well placed. Not withstanding an inequality of bargaining positions the 
dominant parties should seek out an agreement based on reasoned argument rather 
than the use of their dominant bargaining position. If mediator strategies are being 
employed to change the parties' perceptions about relative strengths then mediator 
strategies could be justified within the bargaining environment of JAI. 
5. Did the parties' feel that they have done as well as they could 
reasonably hope? 
This introduces a subjective element to the criteria that is specific to the individual 
negotiating parties so long as the parties understand that they must justify this, 
objectively, by reasoned argument. Therefore, if the parties feel that they have done as 
well as they could reasonably hope to, then JAI asserts that a stable agreement will 
have been achieved. 
Conclusion 
If these questions have been answered in the affirmative then this thesis believes that 
the negotiation environment will be just - under JAI - because it has been freely 
agreed to by equally well-placed parties. Furthermore, the mediated agreement will be 
fair, because fairness is what the parties decide as fair within a just negotiation 
environment. 
This framework will now be applied to two real world mediation events. The first 
mediation event to be analysed is where the mediating state was a powerful state with 
the ability to impose conditions on the parties. The behavioural strategies employed 
were not only facilitative and procedural, but also directive. The second mediation 
event to be analysed is where the mediating state was a medium power and the level 
of intervention by the mediator was low. The behavioural strategies employed were 
either facilitative or procedural. 
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5 CASE STUDY ONE - DAYTON NEGOTIATIONS 
I The Background to the negotiations 
The Republic of Yugoslavia was established in 1945 and comprised of six states: 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia (incorporating Kosovo and 
Vojvodina) and Slovenia. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their 
independence from the Republic. Bosnia-Herzegovina declared full independence on 
March 13, 1992, under the presidency of Alija Izetbegovic. This newly formed State 
was recognised by the European Community and the United Nations. The census of 
1991 showed the population of Bosnia Herzegovina to be 4 365 000, which C011sisted 
of 44 per cent Muslim, 33 per cent Serbs, 19 per cent Croats and 4 per cent others. 
The Capital city became Sarajevo. After the declaration of sovereignty by Izetbegovic, 
Croat, Muslim, and Serb forces began fighting for control, culminating in civil war. 
The Federal government of the Republic of Yugoslavia remained intact until 1992 
even though it had lost authority over Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and 
Slovenia. It retained the Yugoslav National Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Arnlija, 
JNA). On January 3, 1992, at a convention in Belgrade, the Federal Government 
declared it the third republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, and the 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and became Serbia proper. In 1992, Serbia proper 
declared her intention to incorporate the Serbian areas in Bosnia and Croatia, which 
further escalated the conflict situation in the Balkans. 
United States Peace Initiatives 
The United States became active in February 1994 with support for a federation 
within the Muslim and Croat regions of Bosnia Herzegovina. On March 18 1994 a 
federation agreement was signed between these parties. In April 1994 the 'Balkan 
Contact Group' was established by Russia, Britain, France, Germany and the United 
States to co-ordinate peace efforts. It proposed that Bosnia Herzegovina be divided 
between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation on a ratio of 49 percent 
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to 51 percent. To bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, NATO air strikes 
began on August 30, 1995 and finished on September 16, 1995. These air strikes had 
the effect of supporting the Federation of Croats and Bosnian Muslims. In early 
August the Croatian forces with assistance from the NATO air strikes regained control 
of the Krajina region from the Bosnian Serbs. By the middle of September the 
Bosnian controlled territory had decreased from 70% to 50%. On September 14, 1994 
Richard Holbrooke negotiated a cease-fire with The Bosnian Serbs. Below is a 
summary of the U.S peace initiatives during 1995, the year of the Dayton peace 
accords. 
Milestone in the United States Peace Process 1995 
Date Event 
August 16 The introduction of the US Peace Plan 
and the b~ginning of Holbrooke' s 
mediation effort. 
August 28 Bosnian Serb shelling of a market place 
in Sarajevo. 
August 30 The beginning of NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian Serbs. 
September 2 The suspension of NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian Serbs. 
September 6 The resumption of NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian Serbs 
September 8 The Geneva Accord. The question of 
integrity of the State was worked out. 
September 16 The suspension of NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian Serbs 
September 26 The New York Accord 
October 5 The Cease-fire Agreement 
November 1 The beginning of the peace talks in 
Dayton, Ohio 
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November21 The text of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
documents has been initialled in Dayton. 
December 14 The Dayton Peace Agreement has been 
signed in Paris. 
Sourc: Beriker-Atiyas, Dernirel-Pegg 2000: 364) 
Specific Site 
The Wright-Patterson Air force Base in Dayton Ohio was chosen by Richard 
Holbrooke because it represented American power, was within commuting distance to 
Washington D.C and the mediator could control who would have access during the 
negotiations. As Holbrooke himself said, "the size and diversity of Wright- Patterson 
impressed the participants. We wanted them to see this physical symbol of American 
power" (Holbrooke 1998: 233). 
The Air Force knocked walls out and created presidential suites for some of the 
participants. The Hope Conference centre, a two hundred-room hotel, was filled 
completely with administrative and security personnel: 
We placed the American, Bosnian, Croat and combined Serbian-Bosnian Serb delegations in 
the four non-descript visiting officer's quarters that faced each other around a drab rectangular 
parking lot... To emphasize Europe's co-chairmanship of the conference, we gave Carl Bildt a 
VIP suite directly above mine in the American building. The Bosnians were to our left, the 
Croatians to the right, and the Serbians and the Bosnian Serbs directly opposite us. The ground 
floor windows of my rooms looked straight into those of Milosevic across the parking lot... 
thus allowing us to see if he was in his suite (Holbrooke 1998: 233). 
Duration and Process 
The talks were scheduled to last for a period of fifteen days, but in the end there were 
twenty rounds of negotiations over twenty days. The process was officially co-chaired 
between the United States and the Balkan Contact group. Warren Christopher was to 
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arrive at strategically important times as dictated by Holbrooke. The negotiations were 
divided into six areas in day two (see Appendix ll). In reality, the negotiation process . 
was controlled by the United States delegation with the Contact Group limited to 
negotiating on the Federation agreement: 
Handling them (the Contact Group) at Dayton would be a problem. They could meet whenever they 
wished with the Balkan leaders. But the real negotiations with the exception of Steiners Federation 
efforts, would be conducted by the United States (Holbrook 1998: 236). 
II Evaluation of the Mediation Event in terms of a Political 
Theory of Justice 
1. Were there pre-conditions placed on the framework for 
negotiations? 
There were three formal pre-conditions placed on the parties before negotiation were 
to commence. These were: 
1. Each President was required to have full power to sign agreements; 
2. They had to stay as long as necessary to reach agreement without walking out; 
3. No discussions with Press or outsiders were allowed. 
Warren Christopher laid out four conditions for settlement in day one of the talks: 
Bosnia had to remain a state with a single international personality; a settlement must 
take into account the special history and significance of Sarajevo; human rights must 
be respected and those responsible for atrocities be brought to account; and finally, the 
status of eastern Slovenia must be resolved (Holbrooke 1998: 237). 
There were a number of informal pre-conditions and promises made to parties prior to 
Dayton by the United States. For example, the Bosni~n Muslims were promised by the 
United States that they would receive a better federation agreement with the Croats: 
60 
The meeting in New York was intended to help the Bosnians prepare for Dayton ... Sacirbey, 
however, told us his government would not negotiate with the Serbs until we had forced the 
Croats into a new and better Federation agreement. This threatened our original scenario for 
Dayton, but Sacirbey had a point. Negotiating requires flexibility on tactics but a constant 
vision of the ultimate goal. Sacirbey' s demand would slow Dayton down and could even sink 
the conference, but there was no alternative (Holbrooke 1998: 224). 
The United States negotiating team were also under instructions from President 
Clinton that Sarajevo remained as one city: " I have especially strong feelings about 
Sarajevo, it would be a mistake to divide the city. We don't want another Berlin. if 
you can't unify it, internationalise it" (Holbrooke 1998: 226). On day nineteen of the 
negotiations Milosevic asserted that it had been agreed prior to the negotiations that 
the Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation would not receive more than 51 percent of 
the territory. 
The formal pre-conditions would not affect a just negotiation environment in terms of 
JAI. However, the informal discussions between the United States and various parties 
had a detrimental effect on a just negotiation environment. By agreeing to force the 
Croats into changing the federation agreement so that it became more favourable to 
the Bosnians prior to the negotiations, the United States commitment placed the 
Bosnians into a position of strength. The Bosnians did not have to convince the 
Croats, by reasoned argument, that changing the federation agreement was necessary. 
A similar argument exists for the assertion by Milosevic about the territorial 
distribution in the Federation. Milosevic's reaction to this on day nineteen highlights 
the consequence of mediator assurances prior to negotiations. Milosevic felt aggrieved 
because he believed that he made concessions when he did not have to. In subsequent 
negotiations, Izetbegovic had to give up on territory that Milosevic had already agreed 
to relinquish. This became a critical moment for the negotiation process ancl both 
parties felt that they had not done as well as they could reasonably have hoped to. The 
unilateral request by Clinton to retain Sarajevo as a unified city meant that it would 
not be openly justified and agreed upon by all the parties whose political rights would 
be affected by these actions. The pre-conditions agreed to by the United States, 
therefore, placed limitations on the negotiating party's behaviour, and consequent 
motivation to be just within the bargaining process at Dayton. 
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2. Were the parties free to deliberate on the procedures for the 
negotiations and consequences of any outcomes? 
The United States dictated the negotiating style between the parties. For example, 
prior to the commencement of the formal negotiations, the American delegation 
studied the negotiation model of Camp David: 
I phoned President Carter and listened with fascination as he described how he had tried 
without success to get Sadat and Begin to talk directly with each other. He had then reverted to 
proximity talks, a diplomatic technique originating in Mid East negotiations held in the 1940's 
at the U.N., in which the mediator moves between the two parties, who rarely meet one another 
face to face a sort of shuttle diplomacy by foot. We already assumed that l:nis would be our 
pattern, and always referred to Dayton as proximity peace talks (Holbrooke 1998: 205). 
The actual negotiations followed this framework; "These were true 'proximity' talks; 
we could walk from President to President in about a minute. On some days we would 
visit each President in his quarters a dozen times. Our days (and nights) became a blur 
of unscheduled meetings" (Holbrooke 1998: 234). 
The American negotiating team developed positions for most issues that were to be 
addressed at Dayton and had prepared a ninety-two page draft peace agreement. For 
example, "Several task forces framed positions on every issue from elections to the 
creation of a joint railroad commission" (Holbrooke 1998: 205). The draft peace 
agreement became the basis for the negotiations at Dayton: 
That evening, after Christopher left, we handed each Balkan delegation the draft annexes on 
the constitution, elections, and IFOR. Amazed at the detail and length of the documents, the 
three presidents began to realise that when we said we wanted a comprehensive agreement we 
meant it (Holbrooke 1998: 240). 
Although it could be argued that this was a problem-solving approach where America 
was attempting to find solutions, many of the problems were attempted to be solved 
by the American delegation not the parties themselves. This creates a very different 
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set of circumstances for a justice framework based on reasoned argument between the 
parties. 
The negotiations were set up to enhance the power of the mediator. Even though the 
concept of 'proximity talks' limited contact between the parties, this format, in itself, 
did not affect the negotiation climate. These types of limitations, although obstructive 
to allowing full participation, were procedural and would have had a limited effect on 
the parties decision-making process or bargaining positions. However, by limiting the 
range of outcomes that could be negotiated the United States detrimentally affected a 
just negotiation environment in terms of JAI. 
3. Were the parties equally well-placed in the negotiation 
environment? 
If the parties are equally well placed in terms of JAI they will justify their arguments 
in terms ~f 'reasoned argument' rather than their bargaining strength prior to or du:dng 
the negotiation process and the mediator will encourage this behaviour. Bargaining 
positions were used throughout the negotiations. The United States believed that its 
role was to balance the bargaining strengths between the parties. Immediately prior to 
the negotiations, the NATO air strikes had the effect of strengthening some of the 
parties' positions, in addition to forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table; 
At the very moment the President spoke (annourtcement of a ceasefire) our team was in 
Zagreb, urging Tudjman to capture more territory before the ceasefire took effect. You have 
five days left, thats all ... What you don't win on the battlefield will be hard to gain at the peace 
talk. Don't waste these last days (Holbrooke 1998: 199). 
During the negotiations, Tudjman was in a strong position and th:eatened to use it. It 
was understood that Tudjman could prevent a settlement until he got control of 
eastern Slovenia (the last piece of Serb controlled land in Croatia) and he threatened 
to go to war again after Dayton if he did not get the region back: 
Tudjman's ability to prevent a Bosnian agreement and to threaten another war was his primary 
leverage over Milosevic. His influence over Izetbegovic came from his ability to break up the 
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Croat-Muslim Federation, whose continued survival was essential for Dayton to work. For 
years Tudjman had been regarded with contempt by Milosevic and hated by Izetbegovic; now 
he had the upper hand over his two rivals, and he knew how to exploit it for his own goals 
(Holbrooke 1998: 239). 
On day nine of the negotiations Tudjman moved the Croatian forces closer to eastern 
Slovenia to highlight his bargaining strength. Clearly the actions by the parties 
immediately prior to the negotiations and during the negotiations demonstrate that 
some of the parties were prepared to obtain concessions through the threat of war, 
while others had to make concessions on the grounds that it would be preferable than 
no agreement at all. Throughout this process the mediator seemed to attempt to 
balance these competing interests rather than to promote decisions in ~erms of 
reasoned argument and used strategies to promote their own specific solutions, rather 
than that of the negotiating parties. 
4. Did the mediation style involve the use of directive strategies to 
direct outcomes? 
There is evidence that the behavioural strategies of the mediator qualified as directive. 
The mediator prepared most of the documentation for the agreement. Their 
administrative personnel to support the negotiators occupied all of the Hope 
convention centre (Holbrooke 1989). It was considt-red on Capitol Hill an agreement 
in Dayton would result in the commitment of twenty thousand American troops to 
Bosnia at a cost estimated at $2 billion dollars for the first year (Holbrooke 1998). 
Specifically, the United States used its position to encourage parties to negotiate and 
make concessions by offering rewards, threatening th~ parties over the consequences 
of an end to negotiations and the withdrawal of the rewards offered. For example, to 
encourage Milosevic to negotiate, the United States offered to lift sanctions on heating 
oil previously placed against it, on the initialling of an agreement, rather than on 
ratification. As Holbrooke noted, "This small change in our position would give 
Milosevic more incentive to reach agreement in Dayton" (Holbrooke 1989: 236). 
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To Haris Silajdzic of the Bosnian delegation, Holbrooke stated; 
Changing my tone I warned him that Christopher would consider closing down the talks if we 
could not make progress. We had said this before but added that if the breakdown were 
attributable to Sarajevo there would be serious consequences to their government, including 
the possible suspension of our plan to equip and train the Federation forces (Holbrooke 1998: 
271). 
Christopher's final comment to Izetbegovic were; "President Clinton has put an 
enormous amount on the line to save Bosnia. But he will no longer assist your 
government if you tum out to be the obstacle to an agreement in Dayton" (Holbrooke 
1998: 275). 
Directive strategies were clearly in evidence, and used to advance the mediator's 
goals. They were generally not used to encourage the parties to negotiate an agreement 
themselves without resorting to their pre-negotiation positions. However, the mediator 
did attempt to expand negotiating positions and reward concessions. But rewarding 
positions becomes a cost to the mediator, who has the ability to threaten the 
withdrawal of these options to promote their own outcomes. 
In terms of JAI the mediator should only offer concessions or threaten the withdrawal 
of resources if it is reasonable to do so. It would be reasonable to offer concessions 
when it promotes or rewards parties for making concessions based on reasoned 
argument It has been argued in a recent study that integrative solutions were used 
'during the negotiations for the re-distribution of resources. (Beriker-Atiyas and 
Demirel-Pegg 2000). The Integrative solutions identified (expanding the pie, cost 
cutting, non-specific compensation, log-rolling, and bridging) would be acceptable in 
terms of JA 1 when they are offered on the basis where it will not place one party in :1 
stronger bargaining position during negotiations, or when the mediator threatens 
withdrawal of such resources to achieve its own preferred outcomes. A promise of 
resources by a mediator would only be acceptable if it was based on reasoned 
argument. For example, the United States offered to train and equip the Bosnian Army 
but subsequent threatened to withdraw this offer if the Bosnians did not agree to the 
terms of the negotiated agreement (Holbrooke 1998). The United States may have 
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expanded the pie, but their consequent actions would detrimentally affect a just 
negotiation environment. Furthermore, It is clear that the mediator wanted to promote 
its own specific outcomes. Commenting on the failure by the negotiating team to 
obtain all the funding for the I.P.T.F (International Police Task Force) from the United 
States Congress, Holbrooke stated: "This meant we could not write the rules and had 
to allow European input (Holbrooke 1998: 251). The actions of the mediator, 
therefore, were not conducive to a just negotiation environment in terms of JAI. 
5. Did the parties feel that they have done as well as they could 
reasonably hope? 
For a stable agreement to exist in terms of J AI the parties must feel that they have 
done as well as they could reasonably hope. Although this is subjective to the parties, 
the parties must still evaluate the outcomes by reasoned argument. For instance,. it 
would not be acceptable for the parties to assess the outcomes in terms of how well 
they exploited the bargaining position of opposing parties. As an example, when. 
Izetbegovic was reminded of all the benefits that would accrue to him with a peace 
agreement, he still believed that the outcome was not just: 
We reminded him of all the benefits peace would bring .... cessation of hostilities, the lifting of 
the siege of Sarajevo, the partial opening of the roads, the damage NATO had done to the 
Bosnian Serbs, the $5 billion World Bank package that awaited the country after a peace 
agreement, the equip-and-train program for the Bosnian Army (Holbrooke 1998: 274). 
However, at the conclusion of the peace process the formal words by Izetbegovic 
were: 
And to my people, I say, this may not be a just peace, but it is more just than a continuation of 
war. In the situation as it is and in the world as it is, a better peace could not have been 
achieved. God is our witness that we have done everything in our power so that the extent of 
injustice for our people and our country would be decreased. (Holbrooke 1998: 312). 
Consequently, no matter how hard a mediator tries to convince a party that a 
negotiated agreement should be accepted, it is still up to the parties themselves 
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whether or not they will agree to the outcome. And if they do not feel that the 
consequences of the negotiated agreement are not reasonable, then the stability of the 
agreement is in question in terms of JAI. 
Conclusion 
The mediator was motivated by a desire to settle the dispute in terms of moral and 
humanitarian grounds as well as what was in their best interests. However, the United 
States, as mediator, had the ability to implement strategies that could force the parties 
into accepting a specific outcome. Through-out the negotiations, the United States 
used its power to fo::-ce the parties into making concf::::sions. The parties, themselves, 
were not motivated in the bargaining process by a desire to behave fairly. The 
motivation to be just by the participants was not present, and the negotiations could 
not be considered just in terms of a political theory of justice. 
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6 CASE STUDY TWO- OSLO BACK CHANNEL 
I Background to Negotiations 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict like no other international conflict has been shaped 
and quite possibly defined by International Law. Many of the political issues to the 
dispute have been generated from the application of, and interpretation of UN 
Resolutions. The Oslo Back Channel itself was connected, intrinsically, to the 
Security Council resolutions of past. Therefore, this background analysis will focus on 
the legal history of the dispute and secondly, how the back channel was created. 
Legal History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
The Balfour Declaration set the stage for the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was a 
uililateral declaration by the United Kingdom supporting a national home in Palestine 
for the Jewish people. Although the Balfour Declaration had immense political 
consequence, its legal significance was less certain. A unilateral declaration is not a 
treaty. However, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the League of Nations 
Mandate for Palestine which was legally binding. The League of Nations Mandate 
reinforced the Balfour Declaration repeating it in the preamble and· spoke of putting it 
into effect. The operative provisions of the mandate went further by the requirement 
for a 'Jewish national home' on the mandatory for Palestine. In 1947 Britain declared 
it would terminate its mandate and referred the matter to the United Nations. 
Resolution 181 was adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 and called for the 
partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State with Jerusalem to be a 
corpus separatum. The General Assembly can make recommendations only, so the 
legal effect of the resolution has always been in question. Resolution 181 was 
superseded by Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council. There was a 
legal argument that disputed the binding nature of Resolution 242. A Security Council 
Resolution is legally binding for all members under Article 25 of the UN Charter. The 
resolution did not invoke Chapter Vll of the Charter (which confers on the Security 
Council the power to make decisions binding on member states). This argument is 
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now redundant because most of the parties accepted Resolution 242. Furthermore, 
Resolution 242 was reinforced by Resolution 338, which was a decision within the 
meaning of Article 25 of the Charter and thus binding on all member states. 
Establishment of the Oslo Back Channel 
The FAFO (FN Forskningsstiftelsen for Studier av Arbeidsliv, Fagbevegelse og 
Offentlig Politikk) was a Norwegian research organisation under the directorship of 
Terje Rod Larsen who, was an acquaintance of Yossi Beilin the Deputy Foreign 
Minister in the new Rabin lead Labour Government of 1992. Jan Egeland, the 
Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister who was visiting this project suggested to Beilin 
that Norway could help set up a back channel between Israel and the PLO. Beilin put 
Larsen in contact with two academics Dr Yair Hirschfeld and Dr Ron Pundak not 
formally connected with the Israeli Government but who had operated, previously, a 
back channel between Beilin and the top PLO representative in the occupied 
territories, Faisal Husseini (Makosky 1996; Peres 1995). The two academics, 
approached, through an intermediary, Abu Alaa, a senior PLO representative to attend 
a seminar on "human resources" by FAFO to be held at Sarpsborg near Oslo. Abu 
Alaa returned to Tunis to consult with Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO. 
Mahmoud Abbas a senior PLO leader saw the approach as one sanctioned by Peres 
and Beilin and that a channel of r.ommunication between Israel and the PLO was 
being sought (Mahmoud Abbas: 113). The first round of the Oslo Back 
Channel commenced on January 21, 1993. 
Duration and Process 
There were thilieen rounds of negotiation beginning on January 21, 1993 and 
finishing on August 20, 1993. The Oslo Back Channel until the fifth round was 
considered as an unofficial information gathering process. Hirschfeld summarised the 
process up until round five. He said that they had begun with information gathering, 
then moved on to reaching consensus, then to getting official authorisation. In round 
six Peres sent Uri Savir the Director General of the Foreign Ministry which for the 
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first time acknowledged Israeli government involvement and the talks were up-graded 
to 'official' status. In round seven, Joel Singer was introduced as legal adviser, and 
was considered by the Palestinians to be a personal representative of Rabin. The 
mediator did not attend the initial negotiations but liased between the negotiating 
parties and the decision-makers (Mahmoud Abbas: 1995; Makovsky: 1996). The Oslo 
Back Channel was conducted in secret. Indirect negotiations became direct after round 
thirteen. Final telephone calls were made between the leaders and the mediator to 
finalise an agreement. 
II Evaluation of the Mediation Event in terms of a Political 
Theory of Justice. 
1. Were there pre-conditions placed on the framework for 
negotiations? 
There were no pre-conditions placed on the negotiation environment other than 
ground rules that were decided between all the parties. These ground rules were: no 
dwelling on the past; secrecy; and retractability of all positions (Makovsky 1996). The 
parties could not discuss past grievances but this was agreed to between the parties, 
not the mediator, so in terms of JAI this would not be considered unfair. The 
multilateral and bilateral discussions subsequent to the Madrid Peace Conference were 
still operating in parallel and were affected by reliance on protocol. It would therefore 
not be unreasonable for the parties to limit discussion on past grievances: "We had 
therefore to devise another style for the Oslo Channel, a style that would deal directly 
with the substance and the framework of a declaration of principles" (Mahmoud 
Abbas: 115). Consequently the pre-conditions did not affect a just negotiation 
environment in terms of JAI. 
70 
2. Were the parties free to deliberate on the procedures for the 
negotiations and the consequences of any outcome? 
The first five rounds, were informal without agenda with full retractably of positions. 
This was an ideal environment in which to discuss the procedures for the negotiations 
and open discussions on reasons for the various bargaining positions. In effect the 
Oslo negotiating style was the antithesis of the Madrid Peace Conference. 
This direction was one among a number of reasons that made us think carefully about a 
negotiating style other than the one currently employed. We felt that the route to success was 
likely to be in negotiations through a side channel. In this type of negotiation there would be a 
minimum of formalities and no taking of minutes so that everyone could talk freely and probe 
matters without inhibition. In this way, it would be easier to arrive at some common ground on 
specific issues which could then be forwarded to the official negotiating sessions (Mahmoud 
Abbas 1995: 94 ). 
The style of negotiations changed once they became formal, but the previous five 
rounds had provided an ideal background for this change. Israel effectively replaced 
the academics with Government negotiators. Savir, a professional diplomat was 
introduced in round six. Singer a legal adviser was introduced in round seven. On his 
first meeting Savir asked Abu Alaa many questions on the DOP and related issues. 
The parties, however, recognised that this approach brought clarity to t1.l:; pn~cess. 
"Moreover, both sides recognised that Singer's questions brought analytic clarity to 
the informal talks. Whereas Savir avoided potential diplomatic land mines, Singer 
headed directly for them in an attempt to resolve them." (Makovsky 1996: 53). 
Therefore, even the official rounds were conducive to deliberation on the justification 
of the consequences to the outcomes. On reviewing the minutes of round nine 
Mahmoud Abbas reflected how open the negotiators in the channel had become: "I 
was struck by the way that the Israelis had opened up to our delegation, speaking so 
critically of the Americans with such openness and daring." (Mahmoud Abbas 1995: 
160). 
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In terms of JAI, the Oslo Back Channel provided an ideal environment for the parties 
to deliberate on the justification of the procedures for and consequences of any 
outcomes. There were thirteen rounds of negotiation and as mentioned by Hirschfeld 
in round four the channel began without an agenda which in itself enabled 
deliberation without the limitation of strict procedure. Furthermore, the initial rounds 
were unofficial, which allowed open discussions between the parties. The subsequent 
official rounds did not impinge on the party's ability to openly justify their arguments 
by reasoned argument. 
3. Wet'e the parties equally well-placed in the negotiation 
environment? 
Not only must the parties be informed, they must not use the argument that they could 
do relatively well in the absence of an agreement or rely on their pre-negotiation 
positions to justify their argument. The parties will seek to advance their own 
interests, but must limit their demands to what is reasonable. Therefore, when parties 
bargain for concessions, they must be able to justify the concessions sought on 
reasoned argument. The Israeli delegation was clearly in a position of strength. The 
Palestinians were certainly in an unequal bargaining position as their non-agreement 
position was much less tenable than the Israelis. However, in these negotiations there 
seemed a desire in the Israelis to be fair, and not to use their bargaining power to 
obtain an agreement solely on their own terms. "I was determined to negotiate 
carefully so as to achieve a balanced accord, beneficial to both sides." (Peres 1995: 
291). The mediators also attempted to ensure that the parties were well placed to 
negotiate. 
Oslo was·a genuinely neutral ground for conflict management. The Norwegians did everything 
to ensure that all logistical arrangements would be just perfect. the Israelis and the Palestinians 
' 
had the same cars, same hotel rooms, same time for presentations, and often even the same 
food. This process symmetry enabled the Palestinian delegates to feel empowered and thus 
equal to their Israeli counterparts. the arrangements and facilities in Oslo contributed to the 
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"team spirit" or "spirit of Oslo", and thus for some momentum toward effective peacemaking 
(Bercovitch 1997: 230). 
Up until round six the Israeli delegation took a problem-solving approach. In round 
two Hirschfeld stated that the parties should seek agreement where no one loses 
(Mahmoud Abbas: 1996). Meanwhile the Palestinian delegation was attempting to 
justify their position through references to International Law. In round one Abbu Alaa 
referred to UN resolution 237 and 194 as argument over re-uniting Palestinian 
fam.pies. In round six distributive bargaining positions developed. 
Singer also told Rabin emphatically that he favoured negotiating mutual recognition anyway, 
and therefore Israel ~hould use it early on as a bargaining chip to extract concessions on issues 
that it deemed important. Surprisingly, Peres disagreed. Negotiating two breakthroughs 
simultaneously would ensure that neither was successful, he said. Instead, Peres favoured 
using mutual recognition as Israel's ultimate trump card at the end of the negotiations in order 
to extract final concessions from the Palestinians (Makosky 1996: 54). 
The bargaining style became distributive when the parties, to reach an agreement, had 
to offer and trade in concessions. However, the negotiation style was not dominated 
by the use of the parties' bargaining strengths to obtain concessions. The bargaining 
process seemed to operate in good faith. The only time deceptive tactics were used to 
obtain concessions was in the Israeli assertion that if negotiations failed, they were 
preparing to reach a peace agreement with Syria. It is believed that Israeli officials 
made positive statements about a possible agreement with Syria during the 
negotiations (Makovsky 1996). In addition in a letter to Holst, contents of which were 
intended to be disclosed to Arafat, it was mentioned that progress was being made on 
contacts with Syria (Peres 1995). 
The mediator did not dictate the style of negotiations between the parties other than to 
provide surroundings to encourage informality and neutrality for the parties. 
we saw them go beyond the role of host providing conditions of comfort and total secrecy for 
the negotiators, right up to the direct interventions between the negotiators: to reconcile 
viewpoints and provide suggestions, alternatives and sometimes different scenarios. They 
adopted a role of a full partner in the negotiations ... Sometimes they would travel to gain first-
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hand understanding of the thoughts of the leaderships of the negotiating teams and try to 
convince them of what their representatives had brought to the negotiating table. (Mahmoud 
Abbas 1995: 104). 
In terms of JAI the desire to be fair existed within the bargaining process. Israel, the 
party who was in a position of bargaining strength seemed prepared to negotiate on 
the basis of justifying their arguments through reasoned argument, and was prepared 
to look at the negotiations in terms of the other parties' perspective. The mediators 
actively encouraged this approach. 
4. Did the mediation style involve the use of directive strategies to 
direct outcomes? 
Initially, the Norwegians took a facilitative role, promoting an informal environment. 
They would receive briefings from each party after the meetings and liase directly 
with the decision-makers. Holst informed Arafat on July 20 1993 that: "Norway has 
no personal interests and its role is one of facilitation. In Holst's opinion, the most 
successful negotiations take place directly between adversaries" (Mahmoud Abbas 
1995: 107). Yet, this is the period when the mediators became most active. The 
meeting with Arafat and Larson's subsequent report to Peres was considered by both 
of the negotiating parties to have broken the deadlock in the negotiations over the 
DOP. The decision-makers from each of the parties used Holst as a method of getting 
their concerns across to the other. For instance, Holst relayed to Peres (in reports on 
the talks) the Arab concerns about Israel's cleverness in negotiations and their 
perception that Israel appeared to reflect US interests that, they believed were hostile 
to that of the PLO (Peres 1995). Peres relayed to Holst the urgency in finalising the 
negotiaticms: " I intended my Norwegian colleague and friend to convey the substa~1ce 
of my letter in his own parallel contacts with Arafat" (Peres 1995: 296). Holst played 
a vital role at the conclusion of the talks, the only time that the mediator took direct 
involvement in the negotiating process was, during the final telephone calls between 
the parties. 
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In terms of the contingency approach, facilitation strategies were used most by the 
mediators. Directive strategies were rarely employed. 
Whereas the United States utilised directive strategies to get Israel to participate in the official 
Madrid negotiations (Ashrawi, 1995), Norway used mostly communication-facilitation 
strategies ..... Once started, the Norwegians were model, low~profile, process-oriented 
mediators. They provided the setting, made all the arrangements, acted as the 'communication 
link' between Israel and the PLO, but otherwise did not really take part in the negotiations 
(except during the meeting with Peres in Stockholm). (Bercovitch 1997: 232) 
The only time that mediator behaviour resembled directive strategies was in the 
personal meetings between Holst and Arafat, and during the final telephone calls of 
the direct negotiations. In a report to Peres, Holst stated that he had pressed on Arafat 
the need for a decision: "He had been friendly but firm with Arafat, he wrote. He had 
pointed out that the Oslo negotiators had already exchanged" (Peres 1995: 295). 
Pressing the parties is classed as a directive strategy in the mediation literature, 
however, the goal was not to obtain the specific outcomes of the mediator. During the 
final telephone calls Peres suggested to Larson that he relay that Israel was 
considering an alternative arrangement with the Syrians ( Peres 1995). Larson new 
that this was an implied threat but such action could not be classed as deception. 
In terms of JAI the Norwegian mediators did as much as they could to provide a 
negotiation environment that enabled the parties to be informed that would ercourage 
the bargainers to negotiate with each other on the grounds of reasoned argument. The 
Norwegian mediators seemed to have had a genuine desire to transform the conflict. 
If the human element is taken out of negotiations, they become soul-less, even if they do lead 
to agreements. Agreements reached in this way will always need something else to support the, 
consolillate and deepen them. Without doubt, a thorough undeistanding of the psychology of 
negotiation contributed to the success of the mission undertaken by the Norwegian team 
(Mahmoud Abbas 1995: 107). 
This desire helped the parties to come to an agreement by reasoned argument. 
Consequently, in terms of JAI. the parties arrived at their decision by reasoned 
argument and not through the alignment of political forces of the mediator. 
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5. Did the parties feel that they have done as well as they could 
reasonably hope? 
The parties considered that the DOP was the start of a new beginning, or the 
beginning of the end of hostilities. Both parties felt that it was the best they could 
reasonably expect in the circumstances of such a long and intractable dispute. For the 
Palestinians their feelings of accomplishment was immediate: "By the final call, the 
excitement in Arafat's office was discernable over the line. When the last point was 
declared settled, we could hear them cheering and weeping, and we knew that they 
were hugging one another" (Peres 1995: 299). The Israelis felt that the DOP was a 
positive first step toward peace: "I feel I have earned the right to dream. So much that 
I dreamed in the past was dismissed as fantasy but has now become thriving reality. 
Peace in our region is no longer part of a dream world; it has built a permanent place 
for itself in the realm of reality" (Peres 1995: 307). 
Reading the formal speeches of the parties at the DOP signing ceremony of September 
13, 1993, one notices trepidation, but a willingness to leave behind past grievances 
and search for a just and comprehensive peace. There is an acknowledgement of 
interdependence, and therefore the need to consider issues in the light of the other 
pc;rty, the basis of reasonableness in terms of JAI 
Conclusion 
The Oslo Back Channel met all the criteria this thesis believes JAI requires for a just 
negotiation environment. From the analysis of the negotiators' memoirs the outcomes 
were freely agreed to by parties who were informed, and well-placed in the 
negotiation environment. The approach taken by the mediator supported a negotiation 
environment where the parties. with competing conceptions of the 'good' could work 
out rules between themselves that would enable them to live together in peace. It 
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would be difficult to find a better example of a political bargaining process to meet 
the purposes of the theory of J AI. 
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CONCLUSION 
Human error is a permanent and not a periodic factor in history, and future negotiators will be exposed, 
however noble their intentions, to futilities of intention and omissions as grave as any which 
characterised the Council of Five. They were convinced that they would never commit the blunders and 
iniquities of the Congress of Vienna. Future generations will be equally convinced that they will be 
immune from the defects which assailed the negotiators of Paris. Yet they in turn will be exposed to 
similar microbes of infection, to the eternal inadequacy of human intelligence. 
-HAROLD NICOLSON, Peacemaking 1919 
Many theories of justice agree that, within a political bargaining process, the role or 
reason for justice is the regulation of social co-operation. Those theories, however, 
diverge on what motivates participants within such a process to be just. For the 
theorists associated with the ideas categorised under the theory of justice as mutual 
advantage, the motivation to be just comes from the long-term advantage to oneself of 
being just. They are motivated, that is, by self-interest. With the theory of justice as 
impartiality the motive comes from, as Plato so aptly explains, 'within the soul'. The 
parties are motivated by a desire to be just and their requests for concessions within 
the bargaining environment will be based on reasoned argument, rather than the 
-
aJignment of political forces. To accept this theory one must believe that there is a 
moral norm of reasonableness. The level of development of this moral norm is not 
important, so long as there is a psychological capacity for it. Reasonableness, in this 
context, is the consideration of one's own behaviour in the light of others. Barry 
speculates that interdependence within societies or between societies encourages this. 
(Current research in bio-politics lend some support to this notion, Somit and Paterson 
1998). Barry ctevelops this need for the parties to be reasonable into the theory of JAI. 
Barry believes that the motive of reasonableness within the bargaining process 
operates as a mechanism within society to restrain parties from the pursuit of 
everything that they could achieve by their bargaining position. If the motive is- self-
interest then the parties would pursue all that they are able to obtain. This pursuit is 
justified on the basis that any agreement to co-operate will be mutually beneficial 
because co-operation creates a co-operative surplus. The theory of JAI and its 
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associated scanlonian construction provide an alternative; a neogtiating environment 
that is fair and just. Therefore, a negotiation environment that is informed, where 
outcomes have been freely agreed to, which no one could reasonably reject meets the 
conditions for the political outcomes of an agreement to be fair because, fairness will 
be what the parties themselves within this negotiation environment consider as fair. 
However, no matter what the motivation is for justice, its role does not change. Justice 
looks for a standard of behaviour to regulate social mechanisms. Whether this is learnt 
behaviour or part of the intrinsic patterns developed over time, the need or desire to 
promote such standards is the cornerstone of human society. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that within the social process of international mediation a standard of 
behaviour must be introduced by which mediators may be judged in accordance with 
moral norms. 
The purpose of any study is to find better ways of doing things. This thesis attempts to 
define what justice means i!l the context of international mediation. It asserts that the 
present assessment of justice in the mediation iiterature is inadequate for this purpose. 
The analysis of mediation in terms of the social psychological categories of justice 
only assesses mediation behaviour in terms of how the parties to a mediation 
perceived the process. It develops standards of behaviour in terms of the subjective 
requirements of the participants, and this requirement is based on individual 
perceptio;,:;, A p6litical theory of justice develops ideas on how parties should ad 
within the negotiation environment in relation to how their behaviour affects the 
opposing party when they are in pursuit of their own interests. 
Specifically, this thesis has examined the role of mediators and assessed their 
behaviour in terms of how it affected a just negotbting environment in terms of JAI. It 
has concluded that the strategies employed by a mediator' to 'manipulate the parties 
into accepting a specific outcome or to pressure parties into ending a dispute 
(directive strategies) can detrimentally affect a just negotiation environment. 
Mediators use directive strategies (such as rewarding the parties who make 
concessions and threatening the, withdrawal of resources) as political leverage. An 
examination of specific mediator behaviour in terms of justice helps establish an 
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argument why this behaviour is unacceptable. Mediation is a social process and with 
this comes the ability to change, especially if it can be shown why it is important to 
make such changes. In the present literature, analysis of mediator behaviour is often 
simply descriptive, or only examines how behavioural techniques of the mediator 
contribute to a narrowly defined normative criteria for success. An investigation into 
the reasons why behaviour is acceptable or not acceptable, has not been fully 
developed. For instance, the negotiation literature develops theoretical constructs to 
differentiate negotiating behaviour in terms of bargaining solutions. It differentiates 
between bargaining activity when the goals of the bargaining process are in direct 
conflict between the parties (distributive bargaining) and when they are not in conflict 
(integrative).These concepts help in describing negotiation behaviour but do not 
contribute to an understanding of the consequences of this bargaining behaviour on 
the negotiation environment. JAI describes what the motive of parties should be when 
the parties attempt .to negotiate concessions' 'if they are to be just. As mediation is 
triadic in re]ationship, this requirement extends to the mediator in their attempts to 
encourage parties to make concessions. JAI therefore helps to explain why certain 
behaviour is unacceptable in the context of a political bargaining process where the 
fundamental political rights of constituents are at stake. It is the constituents that must 
accept the consequences of the outcomes to this process, and generally not the 
mediator. If these rights have been affected then the political bargaining process must 
encompass a justice framework to develop standards for this behaviour. Without 
stanJurds mediator behaviour cannot be judged nor can mediators acticHs be ju8lified. 
This thesis has shown, through a theoretical perspective, how mediator behaviour can 
be judged. A theoretical perspective however, is only useful if it can be applied to a 
real world event. This has been achieved in this thesi~ by the application of JAI to two 
real world mediations where political rights of the parties constituents were being 
negotiated. 
The Oslo Back Channel met the criteria this thesis established for the requirements of 
a just negotiation environment in terms of a political theory of justice. It showed how 
a party who was in a position of strength had the d~sire to make an agreement that was 
fair. In addition, it seems that the process itself is transformed by the attitude of the 
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parties. The Dayton negotiations did not meet the criteria for a just negotiation 
environment in terms of JAI. The United States used its position of power to promote 
the outcomes that it believed were in the best interests of the parties and the region. It 
is ironic that this conclusion should be written on the day that eighteen people were 
killed in Israel by a Palestinian suicide bomber yet Bosnia Herzegovina seems to be 
stable. It is certainly a valid enquiry to ask what is the purpose of evaluating 
international mediation in terms of this criteria when the outcomes to the two 
mediation events studied are in opposition to the assumption that a just process will 
create stable political agreements. However justice is a virtue, it is not a hypothesis to 
be tested, it delivers to the participants a standard of behaviour in the political 
bargaining process. As explained by Rawls, no matter how efficient or well arranged a 
process may be, it must be reformed or abolished if it is unjust, because justice, is the 
first virtue of institutions. An enquiry into the nature of the mediation process in terms 
of a political theory of justice is an enquiry into the motivation of the parties to be 
just, it is not an enquiry into how successful the parties are in achieving their own 
particular goals. 
This thesis does not provide specific policy prescriptions. It argues that international 
mediation requires rules of behaviour because it is a social process that affects the 
political rights of the constituents of the parties to a negotiation. It shows in a 
theoretical perspective the consequences of cerbin mediator behaviour on a political 
bargaining process. Specifically it shows how power mediation and the use of certain 
directive strategies to affect a negotiation environment, or to direct the parties to 
accept specific outcomes, can lead to an negotiation environment that is unjust in 
terms of a political theory of justice .. 
The general policy prescription that can be taken from this thesis is it is possible to 
provide a touchstone for the assessment of mediator behaviour. It is hoped that 
mediators will evaluate their behaviour in terms of this touchstone so that they will 
deliberate on their actions before they are taken. The evaluative criteria developed 
offer mediators the opportunity to be aware of their behaviour in terms of the 
consequences it may have on the negotiation environment. It allows mediators to 
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create agreements that will assist parties to make agreements which enable the 
participants' constitutents to live together and to prevent the future onset of conflict. It 
also allows the mediator to be aware that he is not just attempting to solve a present 
crisis but is part of a conflict management role which incorporates the prevention of 
future conflict. 
JAI's description of the conditions for a stable agreement is simple but brilliant in its 
simplicity. If a party consents to something freely, then it would be difficult for it to 
be bitter over the consequences of this consent if it has been fully informed as to the 
consequences in the first place. In negotiations, if a party understands the other party's 
viewpoint then it will be less likely to object and feel aggrieved over concessions 
made. And if a party understands what the ramifications of certain behaviour will be 
on another party, then hopefully there will be restraint in the pursuit of this behaviour. 
It is on these basic assumptions that in a just negotiation in terms of JAI, the parties, 
with assistance from a mediator will produce political agreements that are stable. 
Finally, the purpose of justice is to promote standards so that better ways are found in 
which people can live together. The author was reminded of the importance of this 
when viewing a disptay of paintings depicting war by Sarajevo children in 1994. It 
brought a reminder of the terrible consequence ,of conflicts. International mediation 
must be promoted as a mechanism to encourage people to find better ways to resolve 
their disputes so that the children of the children of Sarajevo, or the children of 




APPENDIX I- SPECIFIC BEHAVIOURAL TECHNIQUES 
1. Communication - Facilitation Strategies 
-make contact with the parties 
- gain the trust and confidence of the parties 
- arrange for interactions between the parties 
- identify issues and interests 
-clarify the situation 
- avoid taking sides 
- develop a rapport with the parties 
- supply missing information 
- develop a framework for understanding 
- encourage meaningful communication 
-offer positive evaluations 
- allow the interests of all parties to be discussed 
2. Formulation Strategies (Procedural) Strategies- choose meeting 
sites 
- control the pace and formality of meetings 
- control the physical environment 
- establish protocol 
- suggest procedures 
- highlight common interests 
- reduce tensions 
- control timing 
- deal with simple issues first 
- structure the agenda 
- keep the parties at the table 
- keep the process focused on the issues. 
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3. Manipulation (or Directive) Strategies 
-change the parties' expectations 
- take responsibility for concessions 
-make substantive suggestions and proposals 
- make the parties aware of the costs of non-agreement 
- supply and filter information 
- suggest concessions that the parties can make 
- help negotiators undo a commitment 
- reward the parties' concessions 
- help devise a framework lor acceptable outcomes 
- change expectations 
-press the parties to show flexibility 
- promise resources or threaten withdrawal 
- offer to verify compliance with agreement) 
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APPENDIX II- PARTIES TO DAYTON PEACE TALKS 
Bosnia Herzegovina 
Haris Silajdzic- Prime Minister 
Alija Izetbegovic- President 
Serbia 
Slobodan Milosevic- President to the Republic of Serbia 
Croatia 
Franjo Tudjman - President of Croatia 
United States Negotiating Team (core team) 
Warren Christopher- US Secretary of State 
Wesley Clark- Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 
Chris Hill- Director, 9ffice of South- Central European Affairs, U.S. Dept of State 
Donald Kerrick- Brigadier General, U.S Army 
Robert Owens- legal adviser 
James Pardew- Director, Balken Task Force, Dept of Defence 
Lead Negotiator 
Richard Holbrooke- Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 
Balkan Contact Group 
The Balkan Contact group was originally made up of representatives of Russia, 
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. During the peace talks it seemed to 
operate separately from the United States. The group was lead by Carl Bildt 
(European Union Peace Envoy) who was appointed co-chair with the United States 
for the peace talks. 
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APPENDIX Ill- OVERVIEW OF DAYTON NEGOTIATIONS 
Day one: November 1 
Each president was met privately by Holbrooke and Christopher, to review ground 
rules that they had presented to the parties a month earlier. Each president made their 
priority clear at these meetings: for Trudjen it was eastern Slovenia; for Milosevic it 
was sanctions; for Izetbegovic it was an improved Federation agreement (which had 
already been agreed to by the Americans). 
Day Two: November 2 
Efforts divided into six areas: 
1. Michael Steiner and associates would negotiate Federation agreement between the 
Croats and the Muslims;. 
2. Bildt, Owen and Holbrooke would negotiate constitutional and electoral issues with 
Milosevic and the Bosnians; 
3. Clark and Pardew would begin discussions on military annex; 
4. Two track negotiation on eastern Slovwia, one in Dayton other in the region; 
5. Internal business with Contact Group; 
6. Territorial issues deferred until progress on above (Holbrooke 1998: 240). 
Day 3: November 3 
Large daily Contact Group meetings dissolved as time consuming, reduced to six 
senior representatives. Missing reporter, David Rohde. Milosevic informed no 
agreement at Dayton unless Rohde found unharmed. Bosnian Serbs who were part of 
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Milosevic's delegation sidelined and isolated. Milosevic states, "I'll make sure they 
accept the final agreement" (Holbrooke 1998: 253). 
Day 4: November 4 
Social arrangements. 
Day 5: November 5 
To increase intensity of negotiations, Izetbegovic asked to meet with Milosevic by 
negotiators. 
Day 6: November 6 
American negotiators begin to feel concerned about the time it was taking for 
decisions. 
Good feeling over dinner between Milosevic and Izetbegovic, which was held outside 
Dayton without Tudjman. Both agreed that sanctions on heating oil should have 
stopped on cease-fire. First time common ground on an issue was openly expressed. 
Day 7: Novem~er 7 
Crisis over Federal budget in Washington, meant United States Congress could only 
I 
contribute $50 :mlllion to IPTF (International Police Task Force). The American 
negotiators believed that: "This meant we could not write the rules and had to allow 
European input"(Holbrooke 1998). 
Day 8: November 8 
Federation negotiations on track with Steiner. Large meetings of all three sides called 
for. Face to face negotiations over territory. Each side invited to make an opening 
proposal ratherthan the introduction of an American map. This approach widened the 
differences between the parties. 
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Day 9: November 9 
Christopher's impending departure used as pressure for concessions but with little 
success. Overnight the Croatians increased the pressure by moving their military 
forces closer to eastern Slavonia. Tudjman hinted that he might prefer to conquer the 
region outright in a military action rather than make a deal with Milosevic. 
Day 10: November 10 
European contact group now reduced to Bildt. 
Christopher arrived, wanted breakthrough on eastern Slavonia between Milosevic and 
Trudjman, but they insisted on another seventy two hours. Christopher himself drafted 
two phase approach to remaining problem: "the lesson from Christopher's trip was 
clear: he should visit Dayton only when a problem was nearly solved, so that he could 
push it across the finish line" (Holbrooke 1998: 265) 
Day 11 : November 11 
Agreement between Milosevic and Trudjman on eastern Slovenia. Then returned to 
the maps but serious problems. Milosevic showed 'ludicrous' map and upset Bosnian 
delegation. Holbrooke says will recommend close-down possibly suspend talks to 
Silajdzic. Silajdzic suggests Holbrooke go to Milosevic and say will closedown, as 
believed that it was the only way to get his attention. This was done. Holbrooke says 
to Milosevic that time has come for progress or will shut down talks. Suggested on 
direct talks, and suggested talk to Silajdzic first. Holbrooke tells Silajdzic not to loose 
temper because Milosevic will begin to change at end of discussions. 
Day12:November12 
Agreement on eastern Slovenia signed. New map presented by Milosevic, but it up-
sets Silajdzic. 
Day 13: November 13 
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American negotiators apply pressure on Silajdzic by threatening to withdraw 
American plan to train the Federation forces if talks fail. 
Progress on maps as territorial issues becomes defined. 
Day 14: November 14 
Pressure by Christopher on Izetbegovic, by stating that President Clinton would no 
longer assist his Government if become an obstacle to peace. There was no response 
from Izebegovic over this threat. 
Day 15: November 15 
No movement on core territorial issues. 
Day 16: November 16 
Pressure on Milosevic by American negotiators. Holbrooke says to Milosevic that 
could be like Sadat and provide major gesture for goodwill. Over dinner, first 
negotiation on territories between Milosevic and Silijdzic by way of exchange of 
napkins but no resolution of differences. 
Day 17: November 17 
Day of high level visitors to increase pressure on parties. These visits were carefully 
sequenced; William Perry (U.S. Secretary of State and General Joulwan (Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces Europe) would symbolise American military power and 
determination and: "With their straight forward warnings and uniforms bustling with 
medals, the generals made a powerful impressf~n."(Holbrooke 1998: 286) 
Day 18: November 18 
Christopher did not want to leave again without an agreement. Review of negotiations 
show most of the umbrella document agreed to but the two toughest problems 
unresolved, the territorial issues as represented by the maps and elections. 
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Sarajevo breakthrough, Milosevic offers up Sarajevo. 
Day 19: November 19 
Chart fiasco: To convince Bosnians to make concessions, American negotiators drew 
list of all Bosnians achieved in negotiations, and realised that 55% of territory of 
Bosnia Herzegovina had been conceded to the Federation. This was presented to the 
Bosnians in the form of charts, which the Bosnians held on to. Later that day 
Milosevic saw the charts accidentally. Felt tricked as agreed to no more than 51 % 
prior to Dayton. Compromise deal was then negotiated by Silajdzic with Milosevic, 
but was rejected by Izetbegovic. 
Day 20: November 20 
Intervention by the President. American negotiators felt time right to use this last 
strategy. Believed this could only occur at right moment as believed most important 
not to weaken the President: "The presidential coin is precious and must not be 
devalued." 
President Clinton calls presidents, asked Trudjman and Izetbegovic for 1% to resolve 
map issue. President Clintons call prompts Trudjman to concede. Territorial ratio 
between Federation and Bosnia 52-48, 1% of::-- the 51-49 ratio. American negotiators 
approach Izetbegovic for agreement, but no movement. 
Christopher puts pressure on Izetbegovic: "It is truly unbelievable the Bosnian 
position is irrational. A great agreement is within their grasp and they don't seem able 
to accept it" 
American negotiators decide to give ultimatum, absolute closedown by midnight. 
Milosevic extremely concerned over closedown of talks: "You are the United States, 
you can't let the Bosnians push you around this way."(Holbrooke 1998: 306) 
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Izetbegovic offers final 1% on condition that receives Brcko. American negotiators 
refuse as ultimatum in place, and no new conditions accepted. Milosevic offers 
compromise, arbitration for Brcko after one year. Izetbegovic relents and agreement 
signed. 
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APPENDIX IV- PARTIES TO THE OSLO BACK CHANNEL 
Israel 
Dr Yair Hirschfeld (Haifa University) 
Dr Ron Pundak (of Hebrew University's Truman Institute) 
Uri Savir (DireCtor General Israeli Foreign Ministry) 
Joel Singer (Legal Advisor to Negotiations) 
Palestinians 
Abu Alaa (Director General of the Economics Department PLO) 
Maher el-Kurd (member of Yasser Arafat' s office) 
Hassan Asfour (assistant to Mahmoud Abbas) 
Norwegian Negotiation Team 
Rod Terje Larson (Director FAFO-Forskningsstiftelsen for Studier av Arbeidsliv, 
Fagbevegelse og Offentlig Politikk) 
Mona Juul (member of Stltenberg's personal staff, Holst's Bureau Chief wife of Rod 
Terje Larson) 
Jan Egeland (Director General of Norwegian Foreign Ministry) 
Thorveld Stoltenberg (Foreign Minister, until April 1993) 
Lead Negotiator 
Johan Joergen Holst (Norwegian Foreign Minister) 
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APPENDIX V- OVERVIEW OF OSLO BACK CHANNEL 
Round 1: January 20-23 
The first round was held in Sarpsborg. It began by way of lecture by Marian Heiberg, 
wife Norwegian Cabinet Minister Holst. The Norwegians adopted a conference 
framework, being uncertain over status of the ban on PLO contact by Israel. Y ossi 
Beilin, Deputy Foreign Minister approved the discussions. 
Round 2: February 11-14 
Drafting process begun on a Declaration of Principles (Denoted DOP) for an inter!m 
period of Palestinian self-rule. 
Round 3: March 20-21 
Drafting process concluded for a DOP, and a six page document entitled Sarpsborg 
111 agreed upon. Norwegians pass copy on to American officials. 
Round 4: April 29-May 2 
Round four begins after Israeli pre-condition that Washington talk's resume. 
Hirschfeld introduces a framework'for further negotiations to move the negotiations 
forward after commenting how the negotiations began without an age;oJa. He suggests 
that negotiations should begin on final status talks and how the PLO is to appear on 
the scene. 
Hirschfeld proposes a programme for the following six weeks: first two weeks draft 
DOP to be discussed in Israel; following two weeks draft DOP to be presented to 
Americans; final two weeks Americans to present document in Washington as 
compromise solution to be negotiated for another two weeks (attempt at involving 
Americans, never acted on). 
Round 5: 8-9 May 
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Hirschfeld states that negotiating teams had received official authorisation by Israel 
but emphasised that this did not mean that the delegation had received legal status. 
Hirschfeld emphasised that the talks supported Washington talks and were not a 
substitute. It was emphasised that Rabin still preferred the Washington talks. 
Round 6: 21-23 May 
In early May Abu Alaa informed Larson that the Oslo talks would end unless Israel 
up-graded negotiations to include official representation. He stated that his position 
was of "ministerial rank" (Makovsky 1996). 
On May 13 it was agreed between Peres and Rabin to up-grade the talks to an official 
level. Consequently Joel Singer, Director General of the Foreign Ministry sent by 
Peres to assist in negotiations. 
Talks began on 21 between Abu Alaa and Savir. Savir recommends to Israel that talks 
should continue and that Israel should recognise the PLO. 
Round 7: 13-15 June 
Joel Singer, an Israeli lawyer working for a law firm in Washington D.C law firm and 
confidante of Rabin introduced to assist Singer. Sarpsborg document revised. 
Round 8: 25-27 June 
First formal document produced by the Israeli delegation 
Round 9: 4-6 July (held in Gressheim) 
Drafted reply by Palestinians. During these negotiations several drafts were completed 
on FAFO stationary. Gressheim draft supersedes Sarpsborg lll draft of DOP. 
Round 10: 10-12 July (Held at Halvorsbole Hotel outside Oslo) 
94 
First direct involvement by Arafat. Letter by Arafat handed out by Abu Alaa, which 
according to the Israelis provided a timely and positive contribution. (Peres 1995 295) 
Palestinians returned with 26 revisions of Gressheim draft, Savir said unacceptable, 
Palestinians stated revision no different to what Israel had done when talks became 
official. Rabin authorises Savir to mention recognition in passing and then off the 
record specific terms on 25-26 meeting. 
Round 11: 25-26 July (Halvers bole Hotel) 
Palestinians insist on almost all of the 26 revisions, Israelis refuse to discuss revisions. 
Abu Alaa announces that he was resigning from talks. In private meeting with Abu 
Alaa, Savir provides seven pre-conditions for mutual recognition. but needed package 
deal seven points and eight for eight concessions. 
Round 12: 13-15 August 
Recognition formally placed on negotiating table. Stale-mate ends by offer of 
recognition and PLO concerns that Israeli intended to focus on negotiations with Syria 
(for which Israeli officials reinforced by releasing public statements about prospects 
for negotiations) PLO agrees to four out of the five issues and accept concessions 
surrounding this. 
Round 13: 20 August (final meeting) 
Israelis, Palestinians, and Norwegians initial the DOP at secret ceremony in Norway. 
(Source: Makovsky 1996: Mahmoud Abbas 1995) 
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